Tobacco Control

HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS REGISTER
[Advanced]

Tobacco Control 2006;15(Supplement 4 ):iv77-iv83; doi:10.1136/tc.2004.009555
Copyright © 2006 by the BMJ Publishing Group Ltd.

This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Submit a response
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me when eLetters are posted
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this link to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in PubMed
Right arrow Add article to my folders
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Max, W.
Right arrow Articles by Tsoukalas, T.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
PubMed
Right arrow PubMed Citation
Right arrow Articles by Max, W.
Right arrow Articles by Tsoukalas, T.
Related Collections
Right arrow Economics of tobacco use and control

RESEARCH PAPER

Economics on trial: the use and abuse of economic methods in third party tobacco litigation

Wendy Max1, Theo Tsoukalas2

1 Institute for Health & Aging, University of California, San Francisco, USA
2 University of California, San Francisco, USA

Correspondence to:
Professor Wendy Max
PhD, Institute for Health & Aging, University of California, San Francisco, 3333 California Street, Suite 340, San Francisco, CA 94118, USA; wendy.max{at}ucsf.edu

Objective: To analyse how the tobacco industry responded to economic models and methods used in third party payer tobacco litigation that has occurred since 1994.

Methods: Identified 12 third party payer cases and reviewed the transcripts using WinMax qualitative software. Focused on defendant’s opening and closing statements, followed by trial testimony, depositions, and plaintiff’s transcripts.

Results: Tobacco industry defendants tried to create doubt and confusion about whether or not smoking caused disease and by extension led to health care costs; argued that the economic models used were not legitimate and were not appropriate for estimating the costs incurred by plaintiffs; and criticised the data sources used because they did not consist of the individuals whose health care costs were being sought.

Conclusions: Faced with a new and unprecedented wave of anti-tobacco litigation from third party payers, the tobacco industry tried to adapt strategies that had been used successfully in the past—creation of unfounded doubt and confusion, and manipulation of the discovery process to force plaintiffs to withdraw or concede defeat. The strategies failed because credible economic models of the health care costs of smoking had been developed that were able to quantify the damages to a large group of health care recipients, because plaintiff’s attorneys were able to commit significant resources and willing to undertake substantial financial risk to defend their new legal approaches, and because previous arguments related to individual responsibility were deemed irrelevant in third party litigation.


Abbreviations: BCBS, Blue Cross/Blue Shield; CPS, Cancer Prevention Study; GAMC, General Assistance Medical Care; TDO/DATTA, Tobacco Documents Online/Deposition and Trial Testimony Archive

Keywords: tobacco litigation; cost of smoking; economic methods




This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
Tobacco ControlHome page
D D. Blanke and H. H Humphrey III
Putting truth into action: using the evidence for justice
Tob. Control, December 1, 2006; 15(suppl_4): iv1 - iv3.
[Full Text] [PDF]




HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS REGISTER
Terms and conditions relating to subscriptions purchased online  ¦  Website terms and conditions  ¦  Privacy policy
Copyright © 2006 by the BMJ Publishing Group Ltd.