Elsevier

Preventive Medicine

Volume 39, Issue 3, September 2004, Pages 568-580
Preventive Medicine

Turning free speech into corporate speech: Philip Morris' efforts to influence U.S. and European journalists regarding the U.S. EPA report on secondhand smoke

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ypmed.2004.02.014Get rights and content

Abstract

Background. Previously secret internal tobacco company documents show that the tobacco industry launched an extensive multifaceted effort to influence the scientific debate about the harmful effects of secondhand smoke. Integral to the industry's campaign was an effort to derail the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) risk assessment on environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) by recruiting a network of journalists to generate news articles supporting the industry's position and pushing its public relations messages regarding the ETS issue.

Methods. Searches of previously secret internal tobacco industry records were conducted online and at the Minnesota Tobacco Document Depository. In addition, searches on the World Wide Web were conducted for each National Journalism Center alumnus. Lexis-Nexis® was used to locate news stories written by the journalists cited in this paper.

Results. Philip Morris turned to its public relations firm Burson Marsteller to “build considerable reasonable doubt … particularly among consumers” about the “scientific weaknesses” of the EPA report. A Washington, DC, media and political consultant Richard Hines was a key player in carrying out Burson Marsteller's media recommendations of “EPA bashing” for Philip Morris. In March 1993, Philip Morris' vice president of corporate affairs policy and administration reported to Steve Parrish, vice president and general counsel of Philip Morris, that their consultant was “responsible for a number of articles that have appeared in … major news publications regarding EPA and ETS.” In addition to placing favorable stories in the press through its consultant, Philip Morris sought to expand its journalist network by financially supporting a U.S. school of journalism; the National Journalism Center (NJC). Philip Morris gleaned “about 15 years worth of journalists at print and visual media throughout the country … to get across [its] side of the story” resulting in “numerous pieces consistent with our point of view.” The company planned to “design innovative strategies to communicate [its] position on ETS through education programs targeting policy makers and the media” via the NJC. Finally, journalists associated with think tanks that were financially supported by Philip Morris wrote numerous articles critical of the EPA.

Conclusions. This is the first report, from the tobacco industry's own documents, to show the extent to which the tobacco industry has gone to influence the print media on the issue of the health effects of secondhand smoke. Unfortunately, what we report here is that even journalists can fall victim to well-orchestrated and presented public relations efforts regardless of their scientific validity. It is not clear how various professional media organizations oversee the ethical conduct of their members. Certainly, on the topic of the health effects of secondhand smoke, more scrutiny is warranted from these organizations for articles written by their members lest the public be misinformed and thus ill served.

Introduction

Previously secret internal corporate tobacco documents show that the tobacco industry launched an extensive public relations effort to influence the scientific debate about the harmful effects of secondhand smoke [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. The adverse health consequences of secondhand smoke exposure, also known as environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), have been reported by regulatory agencies and published research for decades [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30]. Although previous government reports such as the 1986 National Academy of Science (NAS) report on ETS [31] and the 1986 Surgeon General's Report on Involuntary Smoking [24] considered ETS a human carcinogen, neither report included a comprehensive risk assessment. In 1987, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was authorized by Congress to research indoor air pollution. Accordingly, the agency released its first draft risk assessment on ETS in June 1990. After an EPA Science Advisory Board, an independent scientific board made up of nine standing members and nine consultants reporting directly to EPA Administrator, reviewed the report, made recommendations, and the standard public comment hearing occurred, a revised draft was released in May 1992. The majority of the submissions received by the EPA during the public comment period that claimed the draft conclusions were invalid were submitted by individuals affiliated with the tobacco industry [32]. Nevertheless, the final EPA risk assessment, Respiratory Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Lung Cancer and Other Disorders, was finally released in December 1992. The EPA classified ETS exposure as a human carcinogen and estimated that ETS caused approximately 3000 lung cancer deaths per year in adult nonsmokers [27]. ETS exposure has also reported to be causally associated with low birth weight and SIDS in infants, acute lower respiratory infections, asthma attacks, middle ear infections in children, and heart disease in adults [29]. In June 2002, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), the cancer research arm of the World Health Organization (WHO), corroborated the EPA's findings from 9 years earlier that ETS is a human carcinogen [30].

In this paper, we expose the tobacco industry's substantial media efforts, using a select group of individual journalists, to influence public opinion on the validity of the EPA report and tobacco control measures in general. Philip Morris carried out the following: (1) recruited a unique network of journalists through an independent political and media consultant; (2) supported internship programs at a U.S. school of journalism to train and place upcoming reporters; and (3) worked with journalists associated with think tanks financially supported by the industry which promoted free market and antiregulation ideals. Through these initiatives, future journalists developed their ability and propensity to write articles criticizing the EPA's risk assessment on ETS and tobacco control in general, and the industry's financed public relations effort allowed for publication and wide dissemination.

Section snippets

Methods

Search terms used for researching the internal tobacco industry documents included all terms listed in Table 1, Table 2, Table 3. Searches were conducted online and at the Minnesota Tobacco Document Depository [33]. The British American Tobacco depository in Guildford, UK, was not specifically searched as our intention was to concentrate on the U.S.-based companies' response to the U.S. EPA report. In addition, searches on the World Wide Web were conducted for National Journalism Center alumni.

Findings

Integral to the tobacco industry's campaign to dispute the emerging public and scientific acceptance of adverse health consequences associated with secondhand smoke was an effort to derail the EPA risk assessment by exacting extreme political pressure through the first Bush administration and former congressman Thomas Bliley (R-VA) [20]. To protect its profits from the 1992 EPA risk assessment findings that secondhand smoke was carcinogenic, Philip Morris turned to its public relations firm

Discussion

This is the first report from the tobacco industry's internal corporate documents to show the manner in which the tobacco industry has influenced the print media on the issue of the health effects of secondhand smoke. Though in keeping with the tobacco industry's strategies to thwart the truth about the health consequences of smoking, this report provides rather dramatic evidence of the techniques the industry used to cultivate media articles to make sure its messages were heard. In addition to

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Laine Bergeson for her document and Internet research, Pat Erwin and Nadine Leavell for their library research support, and Ann B. Peterson and Rhonda Baumberger for their help with the manuscript preparation. This work was supported in part by NIH grant R01 CA90791: “Tobacco Industry Documents on ETS—The Next Front.”

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