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• Evolution, Resurrection, or Zombie Apocalypse?
  Jesse Elias, Pamela Ling
  Published on: 14 February 2018
• There are still lessons to be learned
  Mike Daube
  Published on: 6 February 2018
• Did mammals evolve from dinosaurs? Current UK harm reduction policy did not come from the product modification fiasco of the 1970s
  Martin J Jarvis
  Published on: 19 January 2018
• Evidence-based tobacco harm reduction
  John Britton, Rosanna O'Connor
  Published on: 16 January 2018

• Published on: 14 February 2018

  Evolution, Resurrection, or Zombie Apocalypse?

  • Jesse Elias, Researcher Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education, University of California, San Francisco
  • Other Contributors:
    • Pamela Ling, Professor of Medicine

  NOT PEER REVIEWED
  We thank Dr. Jarvis for his appreciation of our historical scholarship but disagree that our conclusion, “the promotion of tobacco harm reduction may serve the interests of tobacco companies more effectively than the public,” is an attack.

  Our paper is about how policy affects ideas and vice versa. The ideas guiding the product modification program led to bad outcomes. That these ideas have been reanimated merits critical assessment. Voluntary agreements led to industry influence over the ISCSH’s recommendations, which in turn undermined public health. We point out that some of the same premises that led the ISCSH astray are popular again. Jarvis claims that current UK harm reduction policy has nothing to do with the product modification program, and everything to do with the influence of the late Michael Russell. Russell’s impressive scholarship – and oft-quoted statement, “people smoke for the nicotine, but die from the tar” – is indeed hugely influential among proponents of tobacco harm reduction. Jarvis posits that Russell’s work serves as a “paradigm shift” on which the UK’s current embrace of long-term nicotine maintenance and tobacco harm reduction actually rests, and which severs any link between the failures of product modification and widespread fears of a redux today.

  Yet Russell’s work represents more a variation in theme than it does revolution in content. Russell’s policy recommendations operate from the same premises a...

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  NOT PEER REVIEWED
  We thank Dr. Jarvis for his appreciation of our historical scholarship but disagree that our conclusion, “the promotion of tobacco harm reduction may serve the interests of tobacco companies more effectively than the public,” is an attack.

  Our paper is about how policy affects ideas and vice versa. The ideas guiding the product modification program led to bad outcomes. That these ideas have been reanimated merits critical assessment. Voluntary agreements led to industry influence over the ISCSH’s recommendations, which in turn undermined public health. We point out that some of the same premises that led the ISCSH astray are popular again. Jarvis claims that current UK harm reduction policy has nothing to do with the product modification program, and everything to do with the influence of the late Michael Russell. Russell’s impressive scholarship – and oft-quoted statement, “people smoke for the nicotine, but die from the tar” – is indeed hugely influential among proponents of tobacco harm reduction. Jarvis posits that Russell’s work serves as a “paradigm shift” on which the UK’s current embrace of long-term nicotine maintenance and tobacco harm reduction actually rests, and which severs any link between the failures of product modification and widespread fears of a redux today.

  Yet Russell’s work represents more a variation in theme than it does revolution in content. Russell’s policy recommendations operate from the same premises as the ISCSH. While Russell criticized the ISCSH for its discount of compensation, (which he believed medium- high- nicotine cigarettes could help remedy) the same foundations appear in his recommendations: reduced toxicity is reduced risk, (1) collaboration with the tobacco industry doesn’t influence outcomes, (2) nicotine addiction is inevitable, (3) and products must be popular to curtail use. (4)

  We caution that enthusiasm for the tantalizing fantasy of reduced risk products and tobacco industry resources may lead us to readopt the premises promoted by the tobacco industry for decades.

  In their response, Drs. Britton and O’Connor implore public health to promote evidence-based tobacco harm reduction. We could not agree more.

  1. The Lancet. Nicotine Use After the Year 2000. Lancet. 1991; 337: 1191-2.
  2. Russell M. Conversation with Michael AH Russell. Addiction (Abingdon, England). 2004; 99: 9-19.
  3. Jarvis M and Russell M. Comment on the Hunter Committee's second report. British medical journal. 1980; 280: 994.
  4. Russell M. The future of nicotine replacement. British Journal of Addiction. 1991; 86: 653-8.

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  Conflict of Interest:
  None declared.

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• Published on: 6 February 2018

  There are still lessons to be learned

  • Mike Daube, Professor of Health Policy Curtin University, Perth, Western Australia

  NOT PEER REVIEWED Martin Jarvis is right to describe the Hunter Committee era as “a sorry tale” that by and large is well told by Elias and Ling, but his assertion that “taken as a whole their paper reads more as an attack on current UK policy than as a scholarly contribution to the history of tobacco control” is way over the top, as is his criticism of “the editorial processes and decision-making of Tobacco Control”.

  In a paper that runs to a little over five pages of text, there are very brief references to current policies on the first page, then further brief references towards the end, suggesting that there are lessons to be drawn from the earlier episodes.

  The paper might indeed have expanded further on the industry-friendly record of the Hunter Committee, noting that after his term as Chairman of the Committee ended, Lord Hunter became a consultant for Imperial Tobacco, while a civil servant who worked on smoking and serviced the Hunter Committee went on to work for Gallahers. It might also have included more emphasis on the way tobacco substitutes dominated public discourse on tobacco policy issues during the 1970s (1), although in fairness to the authors they appear to have been misled by the re-writing of history evident in some of the material they cite, particularly from industry actors.

  But this would simply have added more weight to the conclusion that during the 1970s discussion, debate and massive promotion of tobacco substitutes by t...

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  NOT PEER REVIEWED Martin Jarvis is right to describe the Hunter Committee era as “a sorry tale” that by and large is well told by Elias and Ling, but his assertion that “taken as a whole their paper reads more as an attack on current UK policy than as a scholarly contribution to the history of tobacco control” is way over the top, as is his criticism of “the editorial processes and decision-making of Tobacco Control”.

  In a paper that runs to a little over five pages of text, there are very brief references to current policies on the first page, then further brief references towards the end, suggesting that there are lessons to be drawn from the earlier episodes.

  The paper might indeed have expanded further on the industry-friendly record of the Hunter Committee, noting that after his term as Chairman of the Committee ended, Lord Hunter became a consultant for Imperial Tobacco, while a civil servant who worked on smoking and serviced the Hunter Committee went on to work for Gallahers. It might also have included more emphasis on the way tobacco substitutes dominated public discourse on tobacco policy issues during the 1970s (1), although in fairness to the authors they appear to have been misled by the re-writing of history evident in some of the material they cite, particularly from industry actors.

  But this would simply have added more weight to the conclusion that during the 1970s discussion, debate and massive promotion of tobacco substitutes by tobacco companies succeeded in hijacking the tobacco public policy and media agenda, and diverted the government of the day from evidence-based approaches recommended by health authorities to reduce smoking. Elias and Ling have good reason to suggest that there are similarities between then and now.

  In passing, Jarvis’s summary that the novel products of the day failed “because consumers rejected them” omits much. One important reason for the failure of tobacco substitutes was that industry rhetoric and hype to the contrary, there was ultimately justifiable concern, with concomitant media coverage, that “all the generally available brands contained 75 per cent tobacco, and were no more than additions to the low and low-to-middle tar range” (1). Indeed, it would have been quite possible for smokers switching to part-substitute brands to find themselves moving to higher tar products.

  But before this message hit, there had been a mountain of industry-generated publicity promoting the notion that “safer” and (as inevitably reported) “safe” new brands were on the way. This approach was supported with public relations ploys such as an Imperial Tobacco press conference about part-substitute cigarettes the day after the launch of the 1977 Royal College of Physicians’ “Smoking Or Health” report. Not surprisingly, the tobacco trade press was quick to congratulate the company concerned on its success in diluting the impact of the College report.

  1. Daube M. The politics of smoking: thoughts on the Labour record. Community Medicine. 1979; 1, 306-314

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  Conflict of Interest:
  None declared.

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• Published on: 19 January 2018

  Did mammals evolve from dinosaurs? Current UK harm reduction policy did not come from the product modification fiasco of the 1970s

  • Martin J Jarvis, Emeritus Professor of Health Psychology Department of Behavioural Science & Health University College London 1-19 Torrington Place, London WC1E 6BT

  NOT PEER REVIEWED
  Elias & Ling throw useful light on the slow-motion disaster that was the series of voluntary agreements begun in the 1970s between government and the tobacco industry in the UK, overseen by the Independent Scientific Committee on Smoking and Health (ISCSH). These had as their aim to address the issue of tobacco product modification to reduce the health risks of smoking. Industry produced new smoking materials with the aim of reducing the biological activity of the tar fraction of smoke from cigarettes, and agreed to a programme of gradual tar yield reduction across the years. The novel products failed because consumers rejected them (there were too few users even to recruit for trials to examine their potential benefits), and the reductions in machine-smoked tar yields were achieved largely through increasing filter ventilation. The material cited shows that the low tar programme fiasco was characterized by undue influence from tobacco industry and a complete lack of understanding of the dynamics of smoking behaviour on the part of the scientific experts charged by government with supervision of the programme.
  This is a sorry tale from the early days of tobacco control, and Elias & Ling tell it well. So far so good. But in framing and interpreting their material they go well beyond the data they cite, and draw quite unwarranted conclusions about what they see as the deficiencies of the current UK harm reduction policy. Indeed, tak...

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  NOT PEER REVIEWED
  Elias & Ling throw useful light on the slow-motion disaster that was the series of voluntary agreements begun in the 1970s between government and the tobacco industry in the UK, overseen by the Independent Scientific Committee on Smoking and Health (ISCSH). These had as their aim to address the issue of tobacco product modification to reduce the health risks of smoking. Industry produced new smoking materials with the aim of reducing the biological activity of the tar fraction of smoke from cigarettes, and agreed to a programme of gradual tar yield reduction across the years. The novel products failed because consumers rejected them (there were too few users even to recruit for trials to examine their potential benefits), and the reductions in machine-smoked tar yields were achieved largely through increasing filter ventilation. The material cited shows that the low tar programme fiasco was characterized by undue influence from tobacco industry and a complete lack of understanding of the dynamics of smoking behaviour on the part of the scientific experts charged by government with supervision of the programme.
  This is a sorry tale from the early days of tobacco control, and Elias & Ling tell it well. So far so good. But in framing and interpreting their material they go well beyond the data they cite, and draw quite unwarranted conclusions about what they see as the deficiencies of the current UK harm reduction policy. Indeed, taken as a whole, their paper reads more as an attack on current UK policy than as a scholarly contribution to the history of tobacco control. Current policy, which had its beginnings some 20 years or more later, is painted as being an outgrowth of the low tar programme and as being similarly tainted with industry influence. It reflects no credit on the editorial processes and decision making of Tobacco Control that authors were permitted to get away with such unsupported conclusions in their published paper.
  The idea that reduction in tar yield of cigarettes could be an effective way of reducing the health risks of smoking goes back to the 1960s at least. It was supported by many distinguished epidemiologists, including Doll, Peto, and Wynder. See for example this 1979 statement by Ernst Wynder: ““One of the things that has always appealed to me about science is that if I find something that makes biological sense, then I feel reassured. Thirty years ago, when we had a 40mg tar cigarette, if you smoked 30 cigarettes a day you were exposed to about 1200 mg tar a day. Today’s cigarettes have 20 mg tar, so you are exposed to 600 mg daily. If there’s one thing everybody can agree on, it is that all tobacco-related cancers are dose related.” (1)
  What was lacking in this formulation was an understanding that the risk from products is not simply determined by their composition, but resides in the interaction between the user and the product – as Michael Russell pointed out, if tar yield was everything, the most dangerous product would be the large Cuban cigar (1).
  Russell was an outspoken critic of the ISCSH’s record. In a 1980 comment on the committee’s second report (2) he noted “Most of all it [the report] is remarkable for the stunning naivety of its implicit model of smoking behaviour”. He pointed out that: “Lower risk cigarettes are equated with cigarettes with lower tar and nicotine yields. If people smoked cigarettes in the same way that smoking machines do, this would indeed be the case. But there is much evidence that they do not….The tendency for smokers to regulate their smoke intake has been ignored by the Hunter Committee”.
  Russell was not a member of the ISCSH (indeed, the membership of the committee was heavily tilted towards epidemiology and toxicology, and included no behavioural science expertise). It is in Russell’s insights and policy prescriptions that we can see the real intellectual underpinnings of UK policy on harm reduction in recent years.
  Russell had a number of key insights, the most fundamental of which is that people smoke for nicotine (3). This coupled with the observation that the harms of smoking come not from the drug people are seeking, but from contaminants of the delivery system used to obtain it, led to his dictum “People smoke for the nicotine, but die from the tar”. As early as the mid-1970s he began to advocate an approach to tobacco harm reduction that was based on an appreciation of nicotine’s role (4, 5). He was the first to expose the fallacy of low tar cigarettes (6) and the first to explore the potential of non-combustible nicotine products for harm reduction (7-9). His 1991 paper in the British Journal of Addiction (10) and editorial in The Lancet (11) set out a vision for a transformed nicotine market: “If a strategy were adopted to sanction and encourage the use of purified nicotine products as substitutes for smoking, and at the same time impose stringent regulations on permissible constituents of cigarette smoke …….. the virtual elimination of smoking could become a more realistic health promotion target” (11). This represents a paradigm shift from the failed approach adopted in the 1970s. How it, or something springing from it, became a part of UK tobacco control policy in recent years, is a story for others to tell. But it did not happen through tobacco industry influence.
  References
  1. Gori GB, Bock FG. Banbury Report 3: A Safe Cigarette? Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory; 1980.
  2. Jarvis MJ, Russell MAH. Comment on the Hunter Committee's second report. British Medical Journal. 1980;5; 280(6219):994-5.
  3. Russell MA. Cigarette smoking: natural history of a dependence disorder. Br-J-Med-Psychol. 1971;44(1):1-16.
  4. Russell MA. Realistic goals for smoking and health. A case for safer smoking. Lancet. 1974;16; 1(851):254-8.
  5. Russell MA. Low-tar medium-nicotine cigarettes: a new approach to safer smoking. Br-Med-J. 1976;12; 1(6023):1430-3.
  6. Russell MAH, Jarvis M, Iyer R, Feyerabend C. Relation of nicotine yield of cigarettes to blood nicotine concentrations in smokers. British Medical Journal. 1980;280(6219):972-6.
  7. Russell MAH, Jarvis MJ, Feyerabend C. A new age for snuff? Lancet. 1980;1; 1(8166):474-5.
  8. Russell MAH, Jarvis MJ, Devitt G, Feyerabend C. Nicotine intake by snuff users. Br Med J. 1981;26; 283(6295):814-7.
  9. Russell MAH, Jarvis MJ, West RJ, Feyerabend C. Buccal absorption of nicotine from smokeless tobacco sachets. Lancet. 1985;2(8468):1370.
  10. Russell MAH. The future of nicotine replacement. Br-J-Addict. 1991;86(5):653-8.
  11. Russell MAH. Nicotine use after the year 2000. The Lancet. 1991;337:1191-2.

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  Conflict of Interest:
  None declared.

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• Published on: 16 January 2018

  Evidence-based tobacco harm reduction

  • John Britton, Professor of Epidemiology Chair, Tobacco Advisory Group of the Royal College of Physicians
  • Other Contributors:
    • Rosanna O'Connor, Director of Drugs, Alcohol and Tobacco

  NOT PEER REVIEWED Elias and Ling conclude that ‘Regulatory bodies should consider toxin exposure, and new products’ actual use, abuse potential and population health effects before endorsing them as safer’. We agree, and that is exactly what Public Health England and the Royal College of Physicians have done [1-4].

  1. Britton, J. and Bogdanovica, I. Electronic cigarettes. A report commissioned by Public Health England. Public Health England, 2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil...
  2. Bauld, L., Angus, K., and de Andrade, M. E-cigarette uptake and marketing. A report commissioned by Public Health England. Public Health England, 2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil...
  3. McNeill, A., Brose, L., Calder, R., Hitchman, S.C., McRobbie, H., and Hajek, P. E-cigarettes: an evidence update. A report commissioned by Public Health England. Public Health England, 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil...
  4. Tobacco Adviso...

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  NOT PEER REVIEWED Elias and Ling conclude that ‘Regulatory bodies should consider toxin exposure, and new products’ actual use, abuse potential and population health effects before endorsing them as safer’. We agree, and that is exactly what Public Health England and the Royal College of Physicians have done [1-4].

  1. Britton, J. and Bogdanovica, I. Electronic cigarettes. A report commissioned by Public Health England. Public Health England, 2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil...
  2. Bauld, L., Angus, K., and de Andrade, M. E-cigarette uptake and marketing. A report commissioned by Public Health England. Public Health England, 2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil...
  3. McNeill, A., Brose, L., Calder, R., Hitchman, S.C., McRobbie, H., and Hajek, P. E-cigarettes: an evidence update. A report commissioned by Public Health England. Public Health England, 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil...
  4. Tobacco Advisory Group of the Royal College of Physicians. Nicotine without smoke - tobacco harm reduction. Royal College of Physicians, 2016. Available from: https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/projects/outputs/nicotine-without-smoke-toba...

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  Conflict of Interest:
  None declared.

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