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New progressive tobacco control legislation in Israel restricted advertising of all tobacco and related products, including heated tobacco products and electronic cigarettes. The three main elements comprised: (1) advertising bans in all media, including broadcast, outdoor, internet and print media, but excluding newspapers (effective March 2019); (2) bans on point-of-sale displays except in specialised tobacco and alcohol outlets (effective January 2020); and (3) plain packaging (effective January 2020).1–3 During the initial implementation phase, an active tobacco control coalition communicated via social media (‘WhatsApp’) regarding tobacco industry tactics to bypass legislative efforts, test the limits of the legislation and/or test the government’s ability to enforce the legislation. The coalition included civil society and professional organisations from a wide range of disciplines, including public health, medicine, public policy, public administration and communications.3 Table 1 provides a detailed account of the policies, industry reactions and lessons learnt (also see figures 1 and 2).
Major weaknesses of the new legislation, which may be relevant to other countries as well, are the lack of: (1) specificity in the language of the legislation; (2) strong implementation guidelines; and (3) comprehensive enforcement plans. With regard to specificity, tobacco control advocates and legislators can leverage the robust global tobacco control network, which has expertise and experience in crafting legislation and anticipating industry response to policy. Implementation guidelines are crucial prior to the implementation phase and should include a campaign for the public and for stakeholders (such as the point-of-sale owners) and practical assistance and guidance for field implementation (such as distributing specific guidelines through local municipalities, and conducting planned and pre-announced enforcement operations without fines for instructional purpose). The Israel legislation requires enforcement at both the national (to enforce media outlet advertising bans) and local levels (to enforce point-of-sale advertisement restrictions and display bans). The proposed bill was a private bill, not initiated by the government. Therefore, including a comprehensive enforcement plan, which would have required allocating significant funding and personnel, may have resulted in lack of governmental support for the bill, and further delay in the approval of the bill.
These limitations to the legislation resulted in tobacco industry exploitation (table 1) and ultimately the undermining of the legislation’s impact. Some of the industry responses to the new legislation were not necessarily considered policy violations. Rather, they expose the ways in which the industry takes advantage of ambiguities in the legislation to undermine its intent and impact. These experiences highlight that passing legislation is insufficient without specificity of provisions and plans for implementation and enforcement.
There is a clear need to instigate an amendment to the law to include quick and efficient mechanisms for responding to the industry that do not require going through the entire legislative process, for example, by establishing a national authority for tobacco control, similar to the US FDA (Food and Drug Administration) authority granted by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act.4 A government decision to establish such an authority was passed in 2011, but never implemented.5
Other attempts to undermine the new legislation were identified. Two months after the legislation was passed in parliament, Juul Labs, joined afterwards by The Vaping Products Manufacturers and Importers Forum, appealed to the Supreme Court to exempt vaping products from the law on the basis that the legislative process was unjust. This appeal underscores the need to anticipate and prepare for such legal challenges and ensure proper legislative processes occur while developing and implementing legislation. The appeal was denied by the court, which ruled that the legislative process was just and that the industry had ample opportunity to voice their concern. This was possible due to actions taken in advance by the Chair of the Parliament Economics Committee (which prepared the bill for the Parliament vote): following recommendations in Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention of Tobacco Control, the Israeli Ministry of Health refused meeting the tobacco or vaping industry representatives to discuss the bill. However, the Chair of the Parliament Economics Committee demanded that the Ministry of Health meet with the opposing bodies. This was resolved through formal meetings with other stakeholders such as the Chambers of Commerce Union (representing the commercial interests of the trade and service sector), which included tobacco industry representatives.6 The Economics Committee chair allowed industry representatives to appear in the committee (despite opposition from the tobacco control coalition) and requested that a Ministry of Health representative respond to each industry argument. These actions ultimately led to: (1) the Ministry of Health consulting relevant regulatory agencies to ensure legislation endorsement of all necessary commerce requirements; (2) all responses to industry arguments being publicly transparent and fully-documented (a legal requirement for all Israeli parliament committee meetings). This provided a solid legal basis for the positive Supreme Court ruling. This emphasises that in setting and implementing tobacco control policies, and in accordance with article 5.3, the tobacco industry might need to be part of the process, but this should be conducted in a regulated, controlled and transparent manner; and preferably initiated by the regulator.
In summary, there are several lessons learnt from this case study. First, the industry uses ‘loopholes’ in legislation; that is, anything not specified and verbiage open to interpretation provides openings for the industry to circumvent the intentions of the legislation. Second, if such efforts are not met with quick responses, the industry will continue and expand their non-compliance and circumvention. Therefore, it is crucial that regulations be as specific and detailed as possible, anticipate industry efforts to identify such loopholes, compel industry compliance through planned, efficient and quick implementation guidelines and enforcement and provide mechanisms to quickly address new industry tactics that defy the spirit of legislation.
Data availability statement
All data relevant to the study are included in the article
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Footnotes
Twitter @yaelbarzeev
Contributors HL, CJB, LA and YB-Z conceived the idea for the manuscript. YB-Z, SK, HHG, EG and HL collected the data. YB-Z wrote the manuscript with all other authors contributing. All authors reviewed and authorised the final version submitted.
Funding This research was supported by the National Cancer Institute (R01CA239178-01A1; MPIs: CJB, HL). Dr Berg is also supported by the National Cancer Institute (R01CA215155-01A1; PI: CJB; R01CA179422-01; PI: CJB), the US Fogarty International Center/National Cancer Institute (1R01TW010664-01; MPIs: CJB, Kegler), and Fogarty/NIEHS (D43ES030927-01; MPIs: CJB, Marsit, Sturua).
Competing interests YB-Z has received fees for lectures from Pfizer Israel Ltd, Novartis NCH and GSK Consumer Health (distributors of smoking cessation pharmacotherapy in Israel) in the past (2012-07/2019). HL had received fees for lectures from Pfizer Israel Ltd (distributor of a smoking cessation pharmacotherapy in Israel) in 2017. LA receives royalties for the sale of Text2Quit and is a shareholder in Welltok, Inc.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.