LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Letters intended for publication should be a maximum of 500 words, 10 references, and one table or figure, and should be sent to the editor at the address given on the inside front cover. Those responding to articles or correspondence published in the journal should be received within six weeks of publication.

Whose standard is it, anyway?

EDITOR—In their recent article in Tobacco Control, Bialous and Yach 1 create the impression that international standards for the machine smoking of cigarettes were foisted on the smoking public unilaterally by the tobacco industry by its influence on the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) through control of CORESTA (Centre de Co-operation pour les Recherches Scientifiques au Tabac). They also allege, inter alia, that the ISO was directed by the tobacco industry (has, through CORESTA, changed the methodology in order to produce lower smoke yield values to get round the European “tar” ceiling directives, and (2) misleads the public by developing low “tar” cigarettes to cheat the smoking machine, and then makes unjustified health claims about them. ("Standards" are documented agreements containing technical specifications or concise criteria to be used consistently as rules guidelines.)

In their article, Bialous and Yach 1 concen-

trated predominantly on a few highly selective quotes from internal tobacco company documents. They appear not to have consulted much of the very large volume of scientific literature published on the subject. When this information is taken into account it becomes obvious that the very narrow and restricted literature base of Bialous and Yach's analysis has resulted in them making factual errors, drawing wrong conclusions and writing inaccurate statements on many aspects of the subject.

A review of the published literature on the subject shows clearly that the broad facts are as follows:

(1) Techniques relevant to the machine smoking of cigarettes were developed and refined throughout the 20th century. 1 The first standard was specified by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), a US federal government agency, in 1966 and first used to test cigarettes in 1967. 2 The CORESTA (Cooperation Centre for the Tobacco Industry) was developed after the FTC standard and was published in 1966. 3

(2) There were small differences in the details of the smoking machine procedures in the various standard methods developed by the FTC and subsequently CORESTA, ISO and authorities in the UK, Germany, Canada and elsewhere between 1969 and the late 1970s. 4 These differences resulted in about a 10% difference in the “tar” yield of the same cigarette measured by authorities in Britain and Germany, for example. By the late 1980s it was recognised that this situation was unacceptable in view of pending European directives which specified “tar” ceilings for all cigarettes sold in member states across Europe from 1993. Consequently, the differences in methodology were harmonised in a common ISO standard method in 1991, developed following a considerable amount of inter laboratory comparisons of the developing methodology undertaken within CORESTA across 29 laboratories from 15 countries. 5 This revised standard method is now used in all countries except the USA where the slightly different FTC method still continues to be used, and in Japan where some minor differences are used in their national standard. Changing to the ISO standard in the early 1990s, “tar” yields determined in the UK, for example, decreased by up to 0.5 mg while “tar” yields in Canada, for example, increased by up to 3 mg for some brands.

(3) The purpose of the smoking machine standards is to determine the “tar”, nicotine, and carbon monoxide content of cigarette smoke when the cigarette is smoked under precisely defined conditions, and hence to allow a comparison of the yields from different cigarettes. Such yields are not predictive of the yields humans obtain when smoking, nor were they ever expected to be so, since no two smokers smoke in exactly the same way on every occasion. This purpose has been stated consistently many times, originally by the FTC in 1967, and subsequently in the scientific literature, published by the tobacco industry and health/regulatory authorities, over the last 35 years, e.g. 6

(4) Compensation by smokers when switching to a low “tar” cigarette has been discussed in the scientific literature for 40 years. The phenomenon was first published by the tobacco industry and tobacco industry scientists have published books and papers on the subject, e.g. 7–11 The available evidence, albeit limited, indicates that compensation is partial in the short term (up to a few weeks), and that smokers switching from a higher to a lower “tar” cigarette in general obtain a reduction in smoke delivery. 12

(5) Since the 1950s numerous health scien-

tists have advocated that lower “tar” cigarettes should be developed in the grounds that they may represent a less hazardous form of smoking, e.g. 7–11 Health authorities have consistently advised smokers to quit, but for those who choose to continue to smoke that they should “smoke” cigarettes, e.g. 8–10 The tobacco industry has responded to these health authorities by developing cigarettes with lower “tar” but has also followed public health advice by not advertising lower “tar” cigarettes as safe cigarettes.

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1 Bialous SA, Yach D. Whose standard is it, anyway? The developing international standards for cigarette smoking and international tobacco and tobacco products. Tobacco Control 2001;10:96–104.


EDITOR—In a recent article, Bialous and Yach 1 attempt “to describe the extent of the tobacco industry involvement in establishing international standards for tobacco and tobacco products.” They assert that “it is clear that the tobacco industry, through [CORESTA], play a major role in determining the scientific evidence and suggesting the standards that are eventually developed as international standards.” Finally, they conclude that “ISO’s tobacco and tobacco products standards are not adequate to guide tobacco products regulatory policies, and no health claims can be made based on [these] standards.” Moreover, along the way, these authors seem to suggest that the ineffective collaboration in CORESTA’s involvement in the standards setting process and offer some examples that, they believe, support a contention that is in fact untrue.

CORESTA (Cooperation Centre for Scientific Research Relative to Tobacco) is an organisation devoted entirely to issues related to tobacco science. Those issues range from plant breeding and genetic practices to technological aspects of manufacturing and analytical determination of smoke yields. That the majority of worldwide tobacco science expertise resides within the tobacco industry should come as surprise to no one (as would be true for most industries facing technical challenges). That many of these experts find themselves involved in CORESTA and International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards setting processes should, likewise, be of no surprise. Development of technical standards, whether within CORESTA or ISO or elsewhere, without relying on the best available technical expertise would, of course, be irrational.

Regarding the suggestion of impropriety, Bialous and Yach outline three areas they believe support their case. First, they claim “ISO standards are approved and recommended by CORESTA, with limited opportunity for significant amendments”. Offered as an example is an excerpt of CORESTA minutes regarding ISO/DIS 11454, stating that the DIS (Draft
International Standard) will be published as an international standard with no changes other than editorial. What Biasoul and Yach apparently fail to appreciate is that the ISO approval process leading up to the DIS stage involved a development period of at least four years and multiple balloting stages (opportu- nities) for significant amendments. For example, balloting at the previous committee draft stage (ISO/TC 126 N 537, July 1995) generated nine pages of comments from 12 countries. The 1997 CORESTA minutes reflect only that at the DIS stage in the overall ISO process, no changes had been requested by ISO members other than those of an editorial nature.

Secondly, Biasoul and Yach made a compound assertion, that “CORESTA works with ISO directly or that CORESTA works through one of ISO’s member bodies”. CORESTA does have a liaison member status with ISO, but does not work with any of ISO’s member bodies.

Lastly, Biasoul and Yach assert “CORESTA resists any interference with its proposed standards, and makes efforts to keep overall control of the situation and the outcomes of ISO meetings”. Offered as support is a matter concerning updates to the ISO smoking methods. Again, an egregious misrepresentation has resulted. A CORESTA working group and the British Standards Institution (BSI) independently prepared editorial commentary on similar issues within the text of the ISO smoking methods. Wishing to defer to the ISO process, CORESTA postponed an update to the existing CORESTA methods, instead wishing to wait for ISO to finish their deliberations.

Commissions of impropriety, Biasoul and Yach assert examples that do not support their contention. Rather to the contrary, these examples serve as testament to the pro- priety of the CORESTA-ISO relationship forwarded to a continued relationship with all parties with an interest in the business of technical standardisation related to tobacco and tobacco products.

Author’s reply

EDITOR—Mr Jacob and Dr Baker’s criticisms of our paper mostly indicate an incomplete reading of it. We believe our paper reached its stated objective and showed that the tobacco industry, through [CORESTA], play a major role in determining the scientific evi- dence and suggesting the [international] standards.” Our conclusion that “ISO’s and tobacco and tobacco products standards are not adequate to guide tobacco products regulatory policies, and no health claims can be made based on [these] standards” derives both from the evidence in the paper and evidence from studies and international reviews. Such standards are useful to rank cigarettes’ nicotine and tar yields according to machine smoking, and measurement methods can be modified to provide different readings without the need for product modification, a point also made by Dr Baker.

Recent literature and health authorities’ recommendations regarding “lower” tar and nicotine cigarettes show that switching to lower yields is no longer perceived as an effective intervention to address tobacco related morbidity and mortality. Several countries and the European Union have already banned or are moving to ban the utilisation of labels such as “mild” and “light” based on scientific and tobacco industry evidence that these mislead the public into thinking these cigarettes are safer.

Indeed, a 1977 British American Tobacco (BAT) document states: “work in this area should be directed towards providing consumer reassurance about cigarettes and the smoking habit. This can be provided in different ways, for example, by claiming low deliveries, by the perception of low deliveries, and by the perception of “mildness”. Furthermore, advertising for low delivery or traditional brands should be constructed in ways so as not to provoke anxiety about health, but to enable the smoker to feel assured about the habit and confident in maintaining it over time.”

We do not suggest “impropriety in CORESTA’s involvement” since, as per the ISO, it is defining the industry is entitled to participate in the process. However, we question the adequacy of having tobacco interests being the sole provider of scientific evidence in the area of tobacco products standardisation methods. We question CORESTA’s involvement as much as the lack of involvement from other interested parties (for example, health and consumer groups) as well as whether or not the ISO is fulfilling its aim of protecting the health and safety of consumers of tobacco products.

Mr Jacob’s assertion that the “majority of worldwide tobacco science expertise resides within the tobacco industry should come as surprise to no one” is correct. However, recent litigation has shown that this expertise has not been used to benefit the health and safety of the consumers of tobacco products. It is also no surprise that many of the tobacco industry experts “find themselves involved in CORESTA and ISO TC 126 activities”, but it is unacceptable that these experts are the only ones participating in these activities.

As for the three specific areas of criticism in Mr Jacob’s letter:

(1) From the description of the ISO stand- ards approval process, the majority of work is done at the Technical Committee (TC) level, and final approval of a DIS (Draft International Standard) is by the TC as well. In the case of TC 126, with a majority of members representing the tobacco industry, and CORESTA being the organisation conducting the work on the proposed stand- ards, amendments are referred back to the TC and to CORESTA. In the example offered, ISO/DIS 11454, reference 34 in our paper” describes some of these comments and how they represent the tobacco industry’s perspective.

The assertion CORESTA works with ISO either directly or through one of ISO’s members bodies . . . “emphasises the great overlap among the people (and interests) who are members of CORESTA, TC 126 and those involved in product development at tobacco bodies such as British Standards Institution (BSI) and American National Standards Institu- tion (ANSI). Although no official relation between CORESTA and ISO’s member bod- ies exists, it is clear that efforts are often aligned. In the example provided, at a CORESTA Scientific Commission meeting a proposal for environment friendly products (EFT) determination was sent to ISO via ANSI. (An unquoted example, from reference 45, states that CORESTA had prepared a draft standard on ambient air to be generated in these activities).

(2) We saw no evidence that CORESTA accepts outsiders’ input in preparing standards forwarded to ISO, but it is clear that the aims to maintain “CORESTA’s standards and ISO standards” are close or identical.” The following quote from the same document addresses how CORESTA planned to deal outside participation (by par- ticipation in the validation stage, not in the development, of a measurement method).

We appreciate the opportunity to address these comments, and Mr Jacob’s offer for a continued dialogue in the area of standardisation of tobacco products.

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11 Short PL. Smoking and health item 7: the effect on marketing. 14 April 1977. BAT Co Minne- sota Trial Exhibit 10,385.
Intermittent smokers probably also suffer less severe withdrawal symptoms during cessation attempts than do daily smokers and, therefore, have a greater potential for success. Intermit-
tent smokers perceive quitting as not being very difficult. However, there are no studies concerning the prevalence of the desire to stop smoking among intermittent compared to
daily smokers.

The public health survey in Malmö 1994 is a cross sectional study. A total of 5600 individuals born in 1913, 1923, 1933, 1943,
1953, 1963, 1968, and 1973 were randomly selected from the general Malmö population and interviewed by a postal questionnaire in the spring of 1994. In each age group, 700 participants (350 men and 350 women) were interviewed. The participation rate was 71%. The desire to stop smoking item, “Do you want to stop smoking?”, had two alternative answers, “yes” and “no”, and the item was dichotomised accordingly. The smoking item contained four alternatives: never smoked, stopped smoking, daily smoker, and intermittent (non-daily) smoker. The sex differ-
ences in daily smoking, intermittent smoking, never smoked, and stopped smoking were calculated using \( \chi^2 \) tests (results only presented in text). The proportions of daily and intermittent smokers that report a desire to stop smoking were also calculated with \( \chi^2 \) tests (results only presented in text). The proportions of daily and intermittent smokers that express desire to stop smoking were calculated separately according to age in the

### Table 1: Crude odds ratios (OR) and 95% confidence intervals of desire to stop smoking among daily smokers and intermittent smokers according to sociodemographic and snu-
characteristics. The public health survey in Malmö 1994.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of birth</th>
<th>Daily smoker n</th>
<th>Daily smoker %</th>
<th>OR (95% CI)</th>
<th>Intermittent smoker n</th>
<th>Intermittent smoker %</th>
<th>OR (95% CI)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>1.1 (0.6 to 2.1)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>1.0 (0.5 to 2.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>1.1 (1.0 to 3.6)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>0.8 (0.4 to 1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>1.7 (0.96 to 3.0)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>1.0 (0.4 to 2.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>1.0 (0.6 to 1.8)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>0.3 (0.1 to 1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>1.1 (0.6 to 2.0)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>0.6 (0.2 to 2.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>0.6 (0.3 to 1.1)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>0.6 (0.2 to 2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>0.2 (0.1 to 0.5)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>1.7 (0.4 to 8.4)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Country of origin</td>
<td>Daily smoker</td>
<td>Daily smoker</td>
<td>OR (95% CI)</td>
<td>Intermittent smoker</td>
<td>Intermittent smoker</td>
<td>OR (95% CI)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>1.1 (0.9 to 1.5)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>2.1 (1.2 to 3.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>&gt; 12 years</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10–12 years</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>1.3 (0.8 to 2.0)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt; 9 years</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>0.8 (0.6 to 1.2)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>0.7 (0.4 to 1.2)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snuff user</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>1.7 (0.8 to 3.7)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>880</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
have been documented in cognitive and psychomotor performance. Smoking of intermittent smokers may be motivated by these effects. The results further support the notion that intermittent smokers are a specific group of smokers with smoking cessation characteristics that differ from the characteristics of daily smokers.

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On-line teen smoking cessation: what's porn got to do with it?

**EDITOR**—As part of our research on adolescente smoking, we collected data on searches of the internet for on-line support for teen smoking cessation. We searched google.com using the words teen quit smoking (without quotation marks) which resulted in hundreds of potential links. In order to narrow the search to more specific tobacco-related sites, we used an advanced exact-phrase search of the key words "teen quit smoking" (with quotation marks) on the same search engine. To our amazement, seven out of the top 20 sites (35%) were teen pornographic sites. This raises concerns about a teen's ability to find legitimate on-line cessation support. This unexpected placement of "teen quit smoking" potentially encourages teenagers to access on-line pornography, an activity that certainly would be discouraged by many proponents of teen smoking cessation. Fortunately, the same search strategies did not yield the same results with other popular internet search engines. Health educators need to be aware of this potential problem, as more and more teenagers are encouraged to access the internet for smoking cessation support and other health related information.

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**Smoking in movies in 2000 exceeded rates in the 1960s**

**EDITOR**—Smoking in movies has been linked to increased smoking among teens. We have previously published data from 1960 through 1997 that shows that smoking fell from the 1960s through the 1980s, then increased during the 1990s. We used similar methods (analysis of a random sample of five of the top 20 grossing US films each year) to extend the data set through 2000 (fig 1).

We conducted a regression analysis of these data by fitting a quadratic equation in time to the amount of tobacco use per hour. The equation, smoke/hour = 801 – 0.405 (t + 0.19) ± 0.044 year + 0.0124 (± 0.0044, p = 0.006 year), confirms that, after falling during the early part of this period, smoking
This work was supported by National Cancer Institute Grant CA-61021.


Figure 1 Frequency of tobacco use (events per hour) in a random sample of top grossing films from 1960 through 2000. The films were watched in five minute intervals and each use of tobacco in a green interval was counted as a single event. The total number of events was then divided by the duration of the film. 4

is now increasing significantly. Based on this regression equation, on average there were 7.3 instances of tobacco use per hour in films in 1960 compared with 10.9 in 2000. The messages continue to reflect tobacco industry marketing themes of glamour, rebellion, and independence, rather than the realities of addiction, suffering, and death.

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BOOK

Book reviews and books of interest to “Tobacco Control” should be sent to the editor at the address given on the inside front cover.

Smoke in their eyes


There have been memorable dates, both glorious and infamous, that have defined and charted progress and setbacks for the US tobacco control movement. The most notable of these events have had global repercussions.

On 15 December 1953, the heads of four major US tobacco firms met in New York City’s Park Plaza Hotel, where they launched the Tobacco Industry Research Council and hammered out the seminal text of a nationwide newspaper ad, “A frank statement to cigarette smokers”. On 11 January 1964, US Surgeon General Luther Terry released the Report of the Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health, concluding “it is the judgment of the Committee that cigarette smoking contributes substantially to mortality from certain specific diseases and to the overall death rate”. At the Waxman Hearings on 14 April 1994, the “seven dwarves”, chief executive officers (CEOs) of the top seven US tobacco companies, were photographed for posterity as they prepared to declare that “nicotine is not addictive”.

At least one more date marks the US tobacco control calendar, but it evokes no signal image, conjures no immortal quote. And yet, on 3 April 1997, at the Sheraton Hotel in Crystal City, Virginia, an extraordinary meeting did take place. That Thursday afternoon, Geoffrey Bible and Steve Goldstone, CEOs of Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds, respectively, met in secret with trial lawyers and state attorneys general, hoping to hammer out a settlement of litigation pending against the tobacco industry. Along with the CEOs, the lawyers, the attorneys general, and their minions, there was one more participant at that meeting: Matthew Myers, vice president and general counsel of the National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids.

In Smoke in their eyes: lessons in movement leadership from the tobacco wars, Michael Pertschuk describes the political path that led Myers to that Virginia hotel and chronicles what happened in the meeting’s wake. Pertschuk, former head of the US Federal Trade Commission, founder and co-director of the Advocacy Institute, and longtime combatant in the tobacco wars, interviews many key players and makes innovative use of email records to “set the record straight” on the role of various advocates during the tumultuous debate over the 1997 “global” settlement and the 1998 McCain bill. However, as the author repeatedly makes clear, the book is as much an impassioned defence of Myers as it is an analysis of the colossal, scarring failures of tobacco control advocates during that time.

At its core, Smoke in their eyes pits Myers against Stanton Glantz, University of California professor of medicine and lead author of The cigarette papers. For Pertschuk, the plausible, if arguable benefits of the McCain bill could have been realised if not for the schism cleaving former allies into hostile camps. According to Pertschuk, great public health gains could have been realised had Glantz and his zealous followers not framed the debate to suit their purposes.

As a behind-the-scenes look at the personalities and polemics of both advocacy groups and political agencies, the book is a rousing success. Though there are few felicitous literary passages, Pertschuk has obtained detailed accounts from former Surgeon General C Everett Koop, former head of the Food and Drug Administration David Kessler, and other principal players, with the glaring exception of Glantz. The book’s central failing, however, is Pertschuk’s unwillingness or inability to focus on Myers’s secret, unilateral decision to attend that first Virginia meeting.

Myers was like Caesar crossing the Rubicon, with just a slight difference or two. Firstly, the general neglected to tell the troops he’d crowned himself emperor. Then, he realised he didn’t know the way to the river’s edge. Those failings are paramount. Myers’ good intentions should not be doubted, but he paved the path to acrimonious, rancorous debate. The Center for Tobacco-Free Kids was not a well established entity in 1997 and many former allies felt betrayed by Myers’ “lone ranger” tactics. Once turned off, they could not easily be convinced to follow Myers anywhere, as demonstrated by the caustic, pitched battles between the rival ENACT and Save Lives, Not Tobacco coalitions.

The what-could-have-beens of the McCain bill are still being debated. The USA is again playing a negative role on the global tobacco stage, this time with respect to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. What is certain is that the tobacco industry knew what it wanted back in 1997 and still knows what it wants today.

Philosopher Isaiah Berlin famously borrowed the dictum of the Greek poet Archilochus, who wrote: “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.” The tobacco industry is a huge, knowing hedgehog. Michael Pertschuk’s insight and intellect help explain how the tobacco control movement has outfoxed itself lately, but his Manichean dichotomy of Myers-good, Glantz-bad does the movement a disservice. The hedgehog rolls along. The fox needs a new game plan.

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