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Tobacco company agreements with tobacco retailers for price discounts and prime placement of products and advertising: a scoping review

Alexandria E Reimold ,¹ Joseph G L Lee ,^{2,3} Kurt M Ribisl ^{1,2}

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¹Department of Health Behavior, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Gillings School of Global Public Health, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA

²University of North Carolina Lineberger Comprehensive Cancer Center, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA

³Department of Health Education and Promotion, College of Health and Human Performance, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, USA

Correspondence to
Dr Kurt M Ribisl;
kurt_ribisl@unc.edu

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ABSTRACT

Objective The objectives of this scoping review are to examine existing research on the often-secretive contracts between tobacco manufacturers and retailers, to identify contract requirements and incentives, and to assess the impact of contracts on the sales and marketing of tobacco products in the retail setting.

Data sources The systematic search was conducted in PubMed/MEDLINE, Web of Science, Scopus, ProQuest Political Science Database, Business Source Premier, ProQuest Agricultural & Environmental Science Collection, and Global Health through December 2020.

Study selection We included studies that collected and analysed empirical data related to tobacco contracts, tobacco manufacturers, and tobacco retailers. Two reviewers independently screened all 2786 studies, excluding 2694 titles and abstracts and 65 full texts resulting in 27 (0.97%) included studies.

Data extraction Study characteristics, contract prevalence, contract requirements and incentives, and the influence of contracts on the retail environment were extracted from each study.

Data synthesis We created an evidence table and conducted a narrative review of included studies.

Conclusions Contracts are prevalent around the world and handsomely incentivise tobacco retailers in exchange for substantial manufacturer control of tobacco product availability, placement, pricing and promotion in the retail setting. Contracts allow tobacco companies to promote their products and undermine tobacco control efforts in the retail setting through discounted prices, promotions and highly visible placement of marketing materials and products. Policy recommendations include banning tobacco manufacturer contracts and retailer incentives along with more transparent reporting of contract incentives given to retailers.

INTRODUCTION

To assist in reducing the burden of tobacco use, the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) Article 13 provides guidance for countries to reduce tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship.¹ Recommendations include comprehensive bans on tobacco company incentive programmes that require prime placement, promotion, discounting, or targeting of tobacco products in retailers. Unfortunately, few countries have banned retailer incentive programmes and many countries continue to engage with the tobacco industry.² In 2019, British American Tobacco, which serves over 180 markets globally, strengthened relationships with retailers and distributors with

loyalty and incentive programmes,³ Japan Tobacco International increased their retail presence in key markets⁴ and the major tobacco manufacturers in the USA spent US\$7.6 billion on marketing, with most of this spending (\$5.7 billion) allocated to price discounts.⁵ Often, underlying the promotion of tobacco products are secretive contractual agreements, ‘contracts’ hereafter, between international tobacco manufacturers and tobacco retailers. Contracts are legally binding agreements that are frequently part of marketing programmes, such as the Retail Leaders Program from Philip Morris, the Retail Partners Marketing Plan Contract (RPMPC) from RJ Reynolds, and the Retail Partnership Plan from ITG Brands. These contracts ensure that tobacco products are heavily marketed in the retail setting through the four ‘P’s’ of commercial product marketing: placement, promotion, price, and product.^{6–10} A list of tobacco contract terminology and specific definitions for the four ‘P’s’ can be found in [table 1](#). Through retailer incentives specified by these contracts, manufacturers have been able to promote newly developed, low-cost brands and implement discounts and coupons at retailers to blunt the impact of price increases related to excise taxes.^{11 12} Discount and promotion requirements in these contracts have the power to increase the amount of retail marketing and price discounts, which have been linked to impulse tobacco purchases, youth exposure to tobacco marketing, and greater tobacco use.¹³ These contracts between manufacturers and retailers are pervasive and long-standing; a 1991 study in New York, USA, found that two-thirds of retailers participated in some form of contract,¹⁴ and a 2018 study conducted in Scotland found that all but one of 23 retailers participated.¹⁵ Though common, contracts are often invisible to policymakers and advocates, and regulation is rare. Nevertheless, one of the few such examples is the restriction on incentives from tobacco manufacturers to retailers legislated in Quebec, Canada, in 2015.¹⁶ This restriction, as part of the Tobacco Control Act,¹⁶ prevents manufacturers from providing price-related incentives (eg, buydowns) to retailers.

Conceptually, contracts are linked to consumer behaviours through modifications to the retail environment and retailer behaviour. Prior work shows that contracts often include provisions for slotting fees, buydowns, and trade promotions.^{6 7 17}

While contracts have important implications for health and policy, research on contracts is relatively sparse, scattered across disciplines, and has not been the subject of a systematic review to date. We



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Table 1 Definitions and terminology-related tobacco company contracts with retailers

Term	Description
Buydown	Promotional or time-limited product price reductions (eg, \$1.00 off a pack of Marlboro cigarettes). With a buydown, the retailer lowers the price of the product by a set amount negotiated with the manufacturer and tracks the number of discounts given, the manufacturer then reimburses the retailer at the end of a set period. Stores without a contract or agreement with manufacturers are unable to provide discounted tobacco products to their consumers.
Contract	Agreement between tobacco manufacturers and retailers that entails requirements and incentives from manufacturers to retailers (eg, Philip Morris Retail Leaders Program, RJ Reynolds Retail Partners Marketing Plan Contract (RPMPC), Brown & Williamson's Kool Inner City Point-of-Purchase [POP] Program).
Incentive	Rewards (eg, free items, monetary gifts, tickets for events or trips) given to retailers for participating in contracts with tobacco manufacturers and abiding by the requirements stipulated.
Placement*	The location where a product is positioned for the consumer.
Price*	The amount that a consumer pays for a product.
Product*	The specific item or good produced by a manufacturer and obtained by a consumer.
Promotion*	The advertising efforts used to highlight a product.
Requirement	Standards (eg, 30% of shelf space) or actions expected by tobacco manufacturers of retailers who participate in contracts to receive incentives.
Slotting fee (slotting payment, listing fee)	Payments by tobacco manufacturers to retailers in exchange for guaranteed shelf space for new or existing products.
Trade promotions	Marketing focused on wholesalers and retailers, instead of focused directly on the consumer through mass media channels.
*Placement, price, product, and promotion form the four 'P's' of marketing.	

conducted a scoping review¹⁸ to explore the state of the existing research and to understand the provisions between manufacturers and retailers. The objectives of this review are to identify the components of contracts, the extent to which contracts are used, and how they impact the tobacco retail environment. We sought to answer three research questions:

1. To what extent does the literature report on the per cent of retailers that have a contract with tobacco companies?
2. What are the pricing, marketing, and merchandising practices that tobacco companies require of tobacco retailers?
3. What is the impact of contracts on tobacco retail outlets in terms of pricing, marketing, and sales?

In addition to answering these questions, we also present contract excerpts and a conceptual model to illustrate the detailed requirements placed on tobacco retailers.

METHODS

This review follows an established scoping review framework¹⁹ and adheres to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses extension for Scoping Reviews (PRISMA-ScR).²⁰ PRISMA-ScR guidelines do not require a risk of bias assessment.²⁰ Because the main purpose of this scoping review was to identify the breadth of existing literature, rather than draw conclusions from it, we did not assess the quality or risk of bias of the included studies with a tool or checklist. The scoping review protocol is registered at Open Science Framework (<https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/RWJ3Q>).

Inclusion criteria

Following the 'PCC' mnemonic (population, concept, context),²¹ we included studies that examined contracts between manufacturers and retailers (eg, the Philip Morris Retail Leaders Program) regarding tobacco product placement, promotion, and pricing or slotting fees in the retail setting. A priori inclusion criteria required studies to be peer reviewed, report on quantitative or qualitative data, examine tobacco products, assess or take place in the retail setting, analyse the content or impact of contracts between tobacco manufacturers and retailers and be published in English. There were no limitations placed on publication date or country. Commentaries, narrative reviews, and studies reporting no original data were excluded but tracked to provide context in the discussion.

Search and screening

While developing inclusion criteria, the research team consulted with a research librarian to create a search string in PubMed/MEDLINE that was then translated to the controlled vocabulary of the other databases used in the search. Keywords included *product terms* (eg, 'tobacco'), *concept terms* (eg, 'contract'), and *context terms* (eg, 'store').¹ Full search details can be found in online supplemental table 1. The search was last updated in December 2020 in seven databases: PubMed/MEDLINE, Web of Science, Scopus, ProQuest Political Science Database, Business Source Premier, ProQuest Agricultural & Environmental Science Collection, and Global Health. After screening the initial search results, we then completed backward citation searching in each included publication to retrieve any relevant studies missed by the initial search.

Search results were imported to Zotero reference management software (Corporation for Digital Scholarship, Vienna, Virginia, USA), deduplicated, then imported to the cloud-based article screening and extraction software, Covidence (Veritas Health Innovation, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia). Once in Covidence, we applied a dual independent screening method where two reviewers (AER and JGL) independently screened all studies. Following the Institute of Medicine guidelines,²² we followed a two-step approach by which both reviewers screened the title and abstract in step 1, then the full text in step 2. Discrepancies in the screening process were discussed and decided on by consensus. If consensus was not achieved, the third author (KMR) provided a deciding vote.

Extraction

We developed an initial list of data to extract from each study, then after reviewing the included studies, the list was reviewed, discussed, and confirmed by all authors once consensus was

¹Full search string for PubMed: (tobacco[tiab] OR cigarette*[tiab] OR 'tobacco products'[MeSH]) AND (contracts[tiab] OR contract[tiab] OR agreements[tiab] OR agreement[tiab] OR advertising[tiab] OR advertisement[tiab] OR advertisements[tiab] OR marketing[tiab] OR 'Tobacco Industry'[MeSH]) AND (store[tiab] OR stores[tiab] OR 'point of sale'[tiab] OR 'points of sale'[tiab] OR retail[tiab] OR retailers[tiab] OR retailer[tiab] OR retailing[tiab] OR shop[tiab] OR 'gas station'[tiab] OR 'gas stations'[tiab] OR 'point of purchase'[tiab] OR 'points of purchase'[tiab] OR outlet[tiab] OR outlets[tiab] OR 'milk bars'[tiab] OR newsstands[tiab] OR kiosk[tiab] OR petrol[tiab] OR garage[tiab] OR garages[tiab] OR 'service station'[tiab] OR 'service stations'[tiab] OR pharmacy[tiab] OR pharmacies[tiab] OR druggist[tiab] OR druggists[tiab] OR supermarket[tiab] OR supermarkets[tiab] OR grocers[tiab] OR groceries[tiab] OR hypermarket[tiab] OR hypermarkets[tiab] OR vendor[tiab] OR vendors[tiab] OR vending[tiab])




Figure 1 Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses extension for Scoping Reviews (PRISMA-ScR) diagram of identified tobacco contract studies.

reached. One investigator (AER) extracted information for each study regarding the first author, year of publication, location of study, year(s) of data collection, study purpose, sample description and size, study design and methods, description of the contract or agreement, contract prevalence, contract requirements and incentives, and the contracts' impact on the retail environment. Two investigators (JGL, KMR) reviewed, edited, and confirmed the final extraction information.

Data synthesis

We performed a narrative review of the included studies. We first developed themes from our knowledge of the existing literature (eg, contract prevalence, incentives, requirements), which guided our research questions and data synthesis. We categorised extracted data from each included study into these themes then synthesised the information. Due to the large number of qualitative studies and methodological heterogeneity, particularly in the study samples (eg, retail store managers, industry insiders, documents, store audits), we decided against performing any quantitative synthesis like meta-analysis.

RESULTS

We reviewed 2786 studies then excluded 2694 during title and abstract screening and 65 during full-text screening. This resulted in a final sample of 27 studies. [Figure 1](#) shows the search and screening process.

Study characteristics and methodology are presented below, followed by a synthesis of findings under each theme: contract description, prevalence, incentives, requirements, and impact on the retail environment. Extracted data from each study can be found in online supplemental table 2.

Study characteristics and methodology

Seventeen studies were conducted in the USA,^{6 14 17 23–36} three in Australia,^{37–39} two in the UK,^{8 15} two in South Korea^{7 40} and one each in Canada,⁴¹ New Zealand,⁴² and Indonesia.⁴³ The earliest was published in 1991¹⁴ and the most recent were published in 2020.^{17 25 38 39} Other than one study conducted in Australia in 2003,³⁷ the 12 studies published before 2010 were all conducted in the USA (online supplemental figure 1). No included papers explicitly examined manufacturers' use of contracts in economies where cigarettes are more likely to be purchased in the 'informal' economy. Of the 27 included studies, 23 (85%) used a

cross-sectional design, 2 reported data from two time points,^{15 31} and 1 reported longitudinal data.⁴³

Contract prevalence and description

A significant proportion of retailers participate in tobacco contract programmes, assessed by interviewing samples of tobacco retailers. Sixteen studies reported contract prevalence which ranged from 0% to 100%. Of these 16 studies, 12 (75%) found that more than half of the retailers surveyed participated in contracts with tobacco manufacturers. Of the four studies that reported a contract prevalence below 50%, one collected data in the USA between 1996 and 1997,³⁵ two collected data in 2017 (one in Canada⁴¹ and one in the USA²⁷), and one collected data in Australia in 2018.³⁸

The most common way to describe contracts was to refer to an existing contractual programme (eg, the Philip Morris Retail Leaders Program) or use the terms 'incentive program' or 'retailer program'. Studies also used the terms 'contract', 'agreement', 'partnership', or unique definitions specific to a study.

Incentives, requirements and impact on the retail environment

Of the 27 studies included, 26 reported requirements expected of and incentives given to retailers. We report the requirements and incentives associated with these contracts using the four P's: placement, promotion, price, and product. Examples from real-world contracts between manufacturers and retailers were made public as part of the US Department of Justice litigation initiated in 1999, *US v Philips*. See [figure 2](#) and three full contracts (Contract 1—Philip Morris USA 2015 Retail Leaders Program Agreement; Contract 2—ITG Brands Retail Partnership Plan Description; Contract 3—RAI Trade Marketing Services ('RAITMS') Retail Partners Marketing Plan Contract, 2017 Menthol Outlet Plan) found on Open Science Framework online (<https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/C3Z4G>).

Placement

The most reported requirements described how tobacco products and advertising must be displayed in the store.^{6 7 14 15 17 23–26 28 29 32 34–40 42 43} For example, one retailer interviewed in the UK reported reserving two-thirds of their tobacco unit space for a contracted manufacturer,¹⁵ and another in the USA recounted that manufacturer representatives required 45% of the tobacco retail space to be dedicated to that particular manufacturer.²⁹ Studies also reported that representatives regularly visited retailers and, to varying degrees, had control over the store design, layout, and placement of tobacco products and advertisements.^{6 8 15 17 24 27 32 37 40} Slotting fees (ie, payments from the manufacturer to the retailer in exchange for shelf space) were also commonly reported as an incentive in different contracts,⁷ particularly in the USA.^{6 17 24 28} The value of this incentive type varied and was reported to exceed the equivalent of thousands of US dollars by a study in South Korea.⁷ The Philip Morris 2015 Retail Leaders Program Agreement specifically stipulates that the plan-o-gram layout of the store indicating exactly where both products and advertisements go, must be followed. In addition to the plan-o-gram, the manufacturer specifies that Philip Morris products must be clearly visible and close to potential customers, at the top of display cases, and can occupy up to 65% of the display space ([figure 2](#)).

Tobacco industry contract excerpts demonstrating the 4Ps of tobacco retail marketing:

P Placement, **P** Promotion, **P** Price, and **P** Product


<p>Placement</p> <p>PHILIP MORRIS USA INC. 2015 RETAIL LEADERS PROGRAM AGREEMENT (Fixture Plan)</p> <p>2015 Retail Leaders Program Form of Plan-O-Gram</p> <p>Retailer agrees to merchandise PM USA products and PM USA Cigarette Signs in accordance with the requirements of this Agreement. With respect to a Store participating in the Fixture Plan, Retailer understands and agrees that certain requirements are illustrated in this Plan-O-Gram. Retailer is solely responsible for full compliance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement, including this Plan-O-Gram. In the event of a conflict between the Plan-O-Gram and the terms and conditions of the Agreement, the terms and conditions of the Agreement will control.</p> <p>PM USA Share (expressed as a percentage) means the greater of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PM USA's share, for a period of time designated by PM USA, of the aggregate cigarette purchases (as reported in STARS) by the Store, or, for any Store that is part of a Chain, all Stores associated with such Store's AGDC management account number=___%; or PM USA's share, for a period of time designated by PM USA, of the aggregate cigarette purchases (as reported in STARS) by all AGDC Workload stores in the zip codes of the AGDC sales territory in which the Store is located, or if the Store is part of a Chain, by all AGDC Workload stores in the zip codes in which any Store associated with such Store's AGDC management account number is located =___%. <p>PCMA Fixture Layout</p> 	<p>Promotion</p> <p>PHILIP MORRIS USA INC. 2015 RETAIL LEADERS PROGRAM AGREEMENT (Fixture Plan)</p> <p>Choice Level and Premium Level Requirements</p> <p>By choosing to participate in the Program at a particular Participation Level with respect to one or more Stores, Retailer agrees that such Stores will comply with the merchandising, signage, and other requirements applicable to that Participation Level, as set forth below. Retailer may not participate in a Display Plan with respect to a Store that is eligible to participate in a Fixture Plan.</p> <p>1. Merchandising Requirements.</p> <p>A. General Requirements.</p> <p>(1) All cigarette and PM USA product merchandising and sales in a Store must be NSS.</p> <p>(2) All PM USA cigarettes in a Store must be merchandised such that they are clearly visible and proximate to adult tobacco consumers.</p> <p>(3) All space designated to merchandise front-facing cigarette packs in a PM USA Display must be occupied by front-facing PM USA cigarette packs.</p> <p>(4) Each PM USA Display must visibly merchandise at least six contiguous front facings of PM USA cigarette packs.</p> <p>(5) In no event may there be more than three PM USA Displays or three PM USA Cigarette Signs in any Store.</p> <p>B. Choice Level Requirements. Each Store must (a) display at least one PM USA Interior Cigarette Sign or (b) merchandise PM USA Cigarettes on at least one PM USA Display.</p> <p>C. Premium Level Requirements. Each Store must (a) display at least one PM USA Interior Cigarette Sign and (b) merchandise PM USA Cigarettes on at least one PM USA Display or one Industry Display.</p>
<p>Price</p> <p>RAI TRADE MARKETING SERVICES COMPANY ("RAITMS") RETAIL PARTNERS MARKETING PLAN CONTRACT 2017 MENTHOL OUTLET PLAN – AMENDED 04/02/2018</p> <p>Consumer Pricing Fairness Program (Applicable to all Contracts)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Retailer must comply with all provisions of the Consumer Pricing Fairness Program ("CPF Program"). Retailer will maintain prominent and accurate pricing communication on and off the merchandising set as determined by RAITMS. Retailer will not engage in deceptive or misleading price communications. Retailer will ensure that the price charged to consumers is not greater than communicated prices. Retailer will prominently and accurately communicate prices on all discounted (off-invoice and/or retail discounts) and/or otherwise promoted brand styles. The ability to advertise price for the Products will be no less than parity with other tobacco companies. Retailer will perform price changeovers, and execute all pricing changes at the beginning date of all price promotion timeframes, as determined by RAITMS. RAITMS may offer price reductions or promotions to meet reductions or promotions made by competitors. [...] Retailer shall price all RAITMS tobacco products competitively with other tobacco products. Retailer must pass through to purchasers no less than the full amount of all RAITMS discounting (whether provided by RAITMS through monthly or pulse discounting). Retailer must pass through the discounting regardless of unit configurations (e.g. packs, multi-pack specials, cartons, tins, sleeves) or loyalty/frequent shopper programs. Retailer must apply the discounting on a product by product, brand style-by-brand style, outlet-by-outlet, value-by-value basis. 	<p>Product</p> <p>RAI TRADE MARKETING SERVICES COMPANY ("RAITMS") RETAIL PARTNERS MARKETING PLAN CONTRACT 2017 MENTHOL OUTLET PLAN – AMENDED 04/02/2018</p> <p>Base Requirements (Applicable to all Contracts)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Outlet or account average Cartons Per Week (CPW) of the Products must be 5 CPW or greater. In the states of New Jersey and New York, the CPW of the Products must be 2 CPW or greater. Outlet must have a menthol share of market of 50% or greater. The Products, and displays and signage for the Products, will be maintained in a highly visible, primary line of sight position, and must occupy the #1 position as defined by RAITMS. If Philip Morris USA (PM USA) has a Retail Leaders Program in the outlet, RAITMS may occupy the #2 position as defined by RAITMS. Retailer will carry and maintain ongoing availability of brands and styles of the Products in all price tiers as requested by RAITMS. Retailer will accept product force outs for new brand introductions and/or promotions. Retailer will merchandise and offer for sale single packs of cigarettes in each of its outlets. The by-the-pack offerings for RJRT and/or SFNTC cigarettes will include a variety and quantity of brand styles in all price tiers adequate to satisfy local market demand. <p>General Merchandising/Presence Requirements (Applicable to all Contracts)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Retailer will provide the space required for RAITMS distribution needs both on and off the primary merchandising fixture. RAITMS total contracted space must be sufficient in size to maintain no less than 1.5 weeks inventory of designated brand styles of the Products. Retailer will provide sufficient space to allow a minimum of one tagged merchandising slot for each brand style of the Products as designated by RAITMS. Retailer will maintain an adequate inventory of required brand styles and will accept new items as requested by RAITMS.

Figure 2 Examples of the four 'P's' in contracts between manufacturers and retailers. Excerpts are exact quotes from two tobacco contracts: RAI Trade Marketing Services (RAITMS) Retail Partners Marketing Plan Contract and Philip Morris USA Retail Leaders Program Agreement. The plan-o-gram in the Philip Morris 2015 Retail Leaders Program Agreement was blank and thus replaced with a completed RJ Reynolds plan-o-gram from 2002.

Promotion

Studies found that, due to their contracts, stores were required to promote products and maintain certain sales volumes to maintain their payments.^{6 23 26 29 32} One retailer in the USA reported that '10%–15% of your contract depends on performance and 10%–15% depends on your volume of sales',³² while another

study in the USA described a specific contract in which retailers were required to sell at least 100 cartons of industry brands and 17 cartons of RJ Reynolds brands per week to qualify for incentives.⁶ Complementing required sales volumes, multiple studies also reported volume discounts (ie, receiving discounts on tobacco products from tobacco manufacturers for purchasing

a large volume).^{24 25 27 29 32 39} An ex-tobacco manufacturer representative in Australia described this as giving larger rebates to retailers for every 1000 'cigarette sticks' they sold.³⁹

To assist in promoting large quantities of product, starting in 2018, studies reported that manufacturer representatives encouraged verbal promotion of products.^{15 17 39} For example, retailers from one study in the UK were expected to promote a particular product to customers for a set period of time. If a mystery shopper asked for a different brand and the retailer suggested a switch to the manufacturer-specified product, that retailer would receive a £100 (≈US\$136) bonus to their contract incentives.¹⁵ The most commonly reported contract incentives were free and discounted tobacco products, advertising materials, gifts or other items given to retailers to keep, give, or sell to customers.^{6-8 15 17 24 28 29 31 33 35-40 43} Often, this included display cases, free samples of new products, promotional signs, and small gifts such as lighters. A retailer from one study in South Korea indicated that 'As soon as [they] sign a contract with headquarters, the tobacco company employees come in and place the advertising and check its placement or change their product displays'.⁴⁰ Sections of the Philip Morris 2015 Retailer Leaders Program Agreement echo similar requirements such that retailers must ensure tobacco products are visible, display tobacco signage, and use branded displays (figure 2).

The most commonly reported impact of contracts on the retail environment was an increase in product availability, tobacco displays, and point-of-sale promotion.^{6-8 14 15 17 23-29 31 34 36 43} According to the retailers interviewed in one US study, retailers with contracts have more signs, displays, and products on sale.²⁹ Another study in the USA found that retailers with contracts had more than twice as many marketing materials than stores without contracts.²³

Studies from the USA and Australia found that contracts impacted tobacco products and promotion, and they had bleed-over effects, impacting other products and forms of advertising.^{14 26 34 37} One of these studies reported that a tobacco manufacturer created a delivery hub for shipments of tobacco products along with other unhealthy products like sweets and convenience foods. This solidified a relationship between the tobacco manufacturer and retailers for inventory, while pairing the purchase and distribution of tobacco and unhealthy convenience foods.³⁷ Individual contracts with food and beverage companies exist alongside tobacco contracts; however, more retailers reported receiving incentives from tobacco manufacturers than food and beverage manufacturers. Retailers also reported that contractual agreements with food and beverage companies lasted for shorter periods of time and specified smaller requirements and incentives.²⁸ One retailer in South Korea stated, 'There are not as many other products [compared to tobacco] that steadily advertise at convenience stores. When a beverage or a candy company introduces a new product...this lasts for only a month.'⁴⁰ Two studies in the USA also found that contracts may undermine tobacco control efforts. Retailers with contracts were less willing to display antitobacco signs in their stores.^{14 26}

Price

Contracts also specify the prices at which tobacco products can be sold.^{6 17 23-25 29} For example, one study in the USA reported that 77% of retailers were required to price tobacco products according to manufacturer or representative directions.¹⁷ Studies consistently reported buydowns (ie, promotional or time-limited product price reductions),^{17 24 25 27 29 30 32 33 37} as part of their

contract. Between 1999 and 2020, studies reported that retailers with contracts offered lower prices for their tobacco products in the USA, Canada, and Australia.^{17 23-25 29-31 37 41} One study in Canada found price differentiation for retailers with contracts, even after the local government banned contractual incentives from manufacturers to retailers.⁴¹ Lower prices were especially apparent for those tobacco retailers at the border of high-tax jurisdictions. One study in the USA reported 'niche' contracts offered to retailers at the border of high-tax jurisdictions that included large buydowns ranging from \$1 to \$3 and price promotions associated with volume discounts.²⁵ Pricing is often stipulated in contracts, instances of which can be found in each of the three contracts mentioned above. For example, the RAITMS 2017 Menthol Outlet Plan states that retailers must prominently display the pricing of RAITMS brand tobacco products, must price them competitively, and must pass the full amount of any discount directly to the customer (figure 2).

Product

Five studies in the USA and South Korea found that the promotional materials and products manufacturers sent to retailers targeted demographics of the area.^{7 17 32 36 40} Two studies in the USA reported that contracts purposefully promoted menthol tobacco products in neighbourhoods with large Black populations, one of which discussed a specifically tailored contract, Brown & Williamson's Kool Inner City Point-of-Purchase Program, aimed at increasing the visibility and promotion of menthol products in predominantly Black neighbourhoods in inner-city urban cores.^{17 36} The results of these studies mirror the RAITMS 2017 Menthol Outlet Plan which specifies that retailers must have a 50% or greater menthol share of the market and are required to keep products and displays in highly visible locations (figure 2).

Additional studies reported manufacturers targeting products towards varying populations. Retailers from one study in South Korea identified different promotional and advertising techniques used by manufacturers based 'on the characteristics of the district',⁴⁰ while another study in the USA found that stores in areas with large racial/ethnic populations, low education, and low income had more in-store advertising for tobacco products than their counterparts.³² A study analysing tobacco industry documents in South Korea found that manufacturers identified young adult males, individuals who recently started smoking, and females as potential targets and opportunities for market growth due to changing cultural norms among young individuals, lack of commitment to a specific brand, and the low smoking prevalence among women.⁷

Miscellaneous and generous incentives

Contracts also commonly incentivise retailers with monetary rewards or vouchers.^{6 8 14 15 17 23 24 33 35-37 39 40 42 43} The reported cash equivalence for retailer incentives varied greatly between \$20/month in urban US cities in 1991³⁶ and \$20 000/year reported in 2001 in the USA,²⁴ with one study reporting the median incentive value at \$930/year in the USA between 2013 and 2014.¹⁷ Contractual relationships also provided retailers with professional support or education from manufacturers in the USA and Australia.^{34 37 39} This included one-on-one meetings, help with designing and merchandising new stores, and off-site events to educate the retailers on new products available and how to best promote them. Generous incentives were given to well-performing retailers in the UK, Australia and, the USA.^{8 36 39} These included tickets for sports, music, and movie

events; lavish parties in which tobacco products were promoted and gifted to guests and staff; and once-in-a-lifetime experiences such as paddle boarding around glaciers, driving Lamborghinis and Ferraris, travelling to Fiji on all-expenses paid trips to view tobacco growing and manufacturing, and sweepstakes to win a Cadillac.

Manufacturer control and retailer compliance

Three-quarters of the retailers interviewed in one US study reported that manufacturers were in complete control of their tobacco displays and promotional materials.¹⁷ A retailer in another US study described the interaction with a manufacturer representative, reporting, 'it's almost like it's not my store... I was overwhelmed, she [the representative] walks in one day and throws some books on my counter and tells me, "I'll tell you what you are going to do"'.³²

According to an interview in one US study, most retailers participate in multiple incentive programmes.²⁹ In multiple studies, contracts were viewed as necessary evils for US retailers to stay in business,³⁴ with one retailer reporting, 'We don't make a lot of money on cigarettes but we make a lot of money on displays'.¹⁷ For this reason, retailers upheld contracts even though they were controlling and demanding.^{17 26 32 34} 'They're trying to control my business,' a retailer reported in one study,¹⁷ and, 'It's not an offer, it's a mandatory thing. It has to be the way they want it,' reported another.³²

Compliance with controlling and demanding aspects of contracts appeared to be enforced. 'You don't want to violate the contract,' a retailer reported in one US study.²⁶ During visits, tobacco manufacturer representatives assessed the fulfilment of contract requirements (eg, product and advertisement placement). These visits were often unannounced, sometimes included the use of a mystery shopper, and described as 'bullish and intimidating' by a UK retailer.⁸ If a retailer was out of compliance, this resulted in a loss of incentives. One study found that after tobacco sales volume decreased, representatives discontinued their visits and manufacturers did not renew their contracts, ending incentives altogether.²⁷ However, another study found that retailers sanctioned by manufacturers for violating their contracts by selling tobacco to minors did not lose their incentives as their contract specified they would. These retailers continued to receive special price offers and promotional materials.³¹

After receiving extensive incentives, retailers from around the world were described as vocal allies for tobacco manufacturers.^{7 15 17 24 37 39} For example, one study discussed that large incentives associated with contracts may lead retailers to lobby for protobacco policy.²⁴ Interestingly, interviews and industry documents from manufacturer representatives highlighted an unexpected, perceived power dynamic that did not match findings from studies with retailers: representatives portrayed retailers as holding power over manufacturers, withholding display space, and demanding larger financial incentives.^{6 37 39} They used language that described retailer incentives as manufacturer requirements with one representative in Australia reporting, 'if we weren't giving [a retailer] a competitive offer, then they would remove most of our slots',³⁹ and an industry document also from Australia stating, 'retailers immediately realized they were sitting on a "gold mine" at retail when print...went away'.³⁷ However, that depicted power dynamic does not represent the typical manufacturer–retailer relationship. Large chain retailers may stake claim over how their shelves are stocked, but manufacturers can 'generally get away with paying [mom and pop shops] \$100, \$200 for 100% of

their price board, which would maintain it from anywhere from 6 to 12 months'.³⁹

Conceptual model

The conceptual model (figure 3) depicts how tobacco company contract components impact the retail environment in ways that may increase tobacco purchases and use. Buydowns and volume discounts facilitate tobacco price reduction^{17 29} while slotting fees, product placement, and promotion increase tobacco product visibility and marketing.^{23–25} Marketing can either aggressively 'push' (ie, promote a product with trade marketing in the retail environment) or more naturally 'pull' (ie, highlight the positive features of a product, like in magazine, online, and billboard advertisements, to create demand and motivate intent to purchase). This model highlights the tobacco industry's current preference for 'push' marketing, the form of marketing that is both more effective and more intrusive.^{24 44} Retailer incentives, a large component of contracts, increase retailer support for manufacturers and reinforce retailer participation in contract programmes.^{15 24 39} Moreover, this retailer support eventually undermines tobacco control policy efforts as retailers promote tobacco products and alert manufacturers to upcoming tobacco policy.^{45 46} Altogether, these produce changes in the retail environment, making it more likely to promote tobacco use and purchasing. This type of retail environment has the power to alter the consumer experience and to thus increase tobacco purchasing and tobacco use.¹³

DISCUSSION

Principal findings

Regarding our research questions, this review on the often-secretive agreements between tobacco manufacturers and retailers found that these contracts:

1. Are common, with the majority of studies identifying contracts in more than half of the retailers sampled.
2. Provide retailers with generous incentives, require strict retailer compliance, use buydowns and discounts to lower tobacco product prices, require retailers to display interior and exterior store signage and other marketing materials while also encouraging retailers to verbally promote products, and provide slotting payments that reserve large swaths of highly visible retail space.
3. Decrease tobacco product prices, increase product marketing and merchandising, and make the retail environment more conducive to tobacco use and initiation.

These contracts essentially give tobacco manufacturers substantial control of some of the most desirable real estate in the retail outlet, creating a pathway by which manufacturers can work through the retailer to push and promote their tobacco products to consumers. This relationship and the resulting impact on the tobacco retail environment threatens tobacco endgame efforts.

Though the number of contracts ranged widely, the majority of studies reported a high prevalence. The wide variation is likely due to the differing tobacco retail and policy environments across the range of years and locations included in this review. The Philip Morris Retail Leaders Program officially launched in 1998 as one of the first contract incentive programmes.⁴⁷ The low prevalence of tobacco contracts found in the 1990s in the USA may portray the early emergence of this type of relationship between the tobacco industry and retailers. The low contract prevalence reported in more recent studies in Canada, Australia, and the USA conducted in 2017 and 2018 may reflect successful




Figure 3 Conceptual model visualising the impact of contract incentive requirements and incentives on the retail environment, consumer experience and behaviour.

policies in the current policy environment. Quebec, Canada, banned this incentive relationship,⁴¹ Australia banned identifiable tobacco packaging and almost all advertising efforts,⁴⁸ and San Francisco, USA, banned tobacco advertising on public billboards and retail signs that can be viewed from the outside of stores.⁴⁹

The vast majority of studies in this review before 2010 were conducted in the USA. This most likely reflects (1) a lack of comprehensive tobacco policy and regulation and (2) the global market in which companies, including Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds, may have begun to implement contracts with retailers in the USA then expanded them into markets around the world. Our findings also indicate that slotting fees are most common in studies from the USA, and it is important for policymakers to understand the influence of contracts on the environment experienced by consumers.

Manufacturer and retailer contracts appear to dictate almost every aspect of tobacco product pricing, marketing, and merchandising. Manufacturers appear to micromanage the retail environment through contracts and, as the identified studies show, retailers often have little control over their store regarding tobacco products and marketing. Prior research consistently indicates that tobacco marketing is associated with tobacco use and initiation.^{50–52} Thus, we assert that these contracts undermine tobacco control efforts and play a role in consumer purchasing and use of tobacco products.

In return for the extensive requirements associated with these contracts, retailers are often rewarded with incentives ranging from small monetary incentives to lavish rewards. Once retailers receive these incentives and begin to depend on them, they develop allegiance and loyalty to tobacco brands and products. Retailer loyalty to manufacturers undermines tobacco control efforts. Tobacco industry documents indicate that loyal retailers

often act as a detection system for local tobacco control efforts, giving tobacco manufacturers early indication of possible legal battles for them to defeat before efforts are passed into law.^{45 46}

According to research published after our search, some contracts are specific to certain products (ie, smokeless tobacco),^{53 54} are publicly acknowledged,⁵⁵ and use mobile technology to promote brand loyalty.⁵⁵ Rather than kept secret, one study found that some retailers in Indonesia advertised their participation in retailer incentive programmes.⁵⁵

Results in context

Our findings are similar to those in the Deadly Alliance Report⁵⁶ which investigated the relationship between manufacturers and retailers, finding that the two work together to undermine tobacco control policy efforts. Contracts may also undermine equity by targeting systematically marginalised populations and neighbourhoods with menthol advertising and products,^{17 36} as recent research finds that neighbourhoods with predominantly Black populations have greater odds of having menthol availability and price promotions than predominantly Hispanic and non-Hispanic white neighbourhoods.⁵⁷

Policy implications

Specific policy options to address contracts include banning them outright (ie, the Quebec, Canada, policy banning incentive programmes¹⁶), banning buydowns,⁵⁸ implementing counteradvertising alongside buydowns,⁵⁸ using clear language that bans ‘advertising’ rather than ‘promotion’,⁵⁸ banning all business-to-business and business-to-consumer advertising to undercut the loophole allowing wholesale advertising that many manufacturers take advantage of, and requiring all payments from manufacturers to retailers be made publicly available (eg, sunshine

laws in the USA that shed light on government and corporate operations).^{58–60} One study in our review assessed the incentive programme ban in Quebec⁴¹ but found no effects of the ban on tobacco pricing a year after enactment. This may indicate that contract bans are not effective enough on their own and require supplemental policy, that compliance and enforcement were inadequate, or that further research is needed to assess additional aspects of this type of ban on the tobacco retail environment.

Like manufacturers, some governments can also enter into contracts with retailers. A small body of literature assesses the effectiveness of Assurances of Voluntary Compliance (AVCs), which are agreements between corporate retailers and state attorneys general in the USA. AVCs act as a legal contract between two parties and can include provisions to reduce exposure to marketing. These agreements are not subject to the same First Amendment protections that preclude many efforts to regulate tobacco marketing in the USA. Research indicates that AVCs may successfully reduce access to tobacco products and advertising but must be thoroughly enforced to be effective.^{61–63} AVCs may be an effective option for countries operating under a free market or those with a time-consuming policy-making process.

Recommendations for future research

Future research should analyse how contract prevalence and policy responses vary globally, with a particular focus on low and middle-income countries with informal economies. This line of research should assess existing global policies, including contract bans, in relation to contract prevalence to identify effective tobacco control policy. Future work should also consider policy interventions that disrupt the relationship between tobacco manufacturers and retailers, strengthen tobacco control laws to ban contracts and retail displays, and assess the role of public health contracts (AVCs) to further the goal of a tobacco endgame. Future research is also needed to further understand the relationship between contracts, area-level sociodemographic variables, and menthol availability and promotion. This review largely includes cross-sectional, observational studies. We identify the need for longitudinal designs to improve causal inference.

Strengths and limitations

Our review highlights a long-standing worldwide issue that has gone without major global recognition for decades. The scope of our review covers 30 years, four continents, and identifies a burgeoning line of research recognised globally in only the last decade. However, because this review is the first of its kind, and we wanted to understand the scope of reliable research on the

topic, we only included peer-reviewed literature. Though this means our methods are easily replicable, it also means we may have excluded applicable studies that have not undergone the peer review process. Although our inclusion criteria were limited to articles in English, we are not aware of any studies published in other languages; however, we did not search using non-English keywords. Additionally, there was heterogeneity among the retailer sampling methods and results so we are unable to conclude, definitively, the actual prevalence of tobacco contracts around the world. This may reflect true variation in prevalence across varying locations. Our findings are limited by what is reported in the literature, the sampling methods used, and how researchers chose to design, collect and present their studies. This review should be used to draw preliminary, rather than definitive, conclusions about the existing literature and trends in tobacco manufacturer contracts.

CONCLUSIONS

Often-secretive contracts change the retailer environment in ways that influence consumer behaviour. In many retail spaces across the globe, the products available, pricing, and advertising present—and even interactions with store clerks—are influenced by contracts that are invisible to consumers. According to our results, such contracts are pervasive globally, highlighting the incongruity between FCTC recommendations¹ and reality. Addressing contracts should be a public health priority to decrease tobacco promotion and improve public health.

Twitter Alexandria E Reimold @AllieReimold, Joseph G L Lee @Joseph_GL_Lee and Kurt M Ribisl @KurtRibisl

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Patient consent for publication Not required.

Ethics approval This study does not involve human participants.

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ORCID iDs

Alexandria E Reimold <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9777-7825>

Joseph G L Lee <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9698-649X>

Kurt M Ribisl <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3318-8524>

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What this paper adds


- ⇒ Tobacco product manufacturers use incentives and requirements stipulated in contractual agreements with tobacco retailers to promote and advertise tobacco products.
- ⇒ To our knowledge, no review of the literature on contracts between tobacco manufacturers and tobacco retailers exists.
- ⇒ Our scoping review includes 27 studies and concludes that contracts are common among tobacco retailers; manufacturers provide retailers with generous incentives to promote tobacco products and provide prime placement; and contracts decrease tobacco prices and increase marketing.
- ⇒ Policy options include banning contracts and requiring payments from manufacturers to retailers be made publicly available.

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Supplemental figures and tables

Supplemental Figure 1. The number of identified articles published from different regions over time.



Supplemental Table 1. Databases and search strings used for scoping review.

Database	Search String
PubMed	<p>(tobacco[tiab] OR cigarette*[tiab] OR “tobacco products”[MeSH])</p> <p>AND</p> <p>(contracts[tiab] OR contract[tiab] OR agreements[tiab] OR agreement[tiab] OR advertising[tiab] OR advertisement[tiab] OR advertisements[tiab] OR marketing[tiab] OR “Tobacco Industry”[MeSH])</p> <p>AND</p> <p>(store[tiab] OR stores[tiab] OR “point of sale”[tiab] OR “points of sale”[tiab] OR retail[tiab] OR retailers[tiab] OR retailer[tiab] OR retailing[tiab] OR shop[tiab] OR “gas station”[tiab] OR “gas stations”[tiab] OR “point of purchase”[tiab] OR “points of purchase”[tiab] OR outlet[tiab] OR outlets[tiab] OR “milk bars”[tiab] OR newsstands[tiab] OR kiosk[tiab] OR petrol[tiab] OR garage[tiab] OR garages[tiab] OR “service station”[tiab] OR “service stations”[tiab] OR pharmacy[tiab] OR pharmacies[tiab] OR druggist[tiab] OR druggists[tiab] OR supermarket[tiab] OR supermarkets[tiab] OR grocers[tiab] OR groceries[tiab] OR hypermarket[tiab] OR hypermarkets[tiab] OR vendor[tiab] OR vendors[tiab] OR vending[tiab])</p>
Web of Science	<p>(TI=(tobacco OR cigarette* OR "tobacco products") OR AB=(tobacco OR cigarette* OR "tobacco products"))</p> <p>AND</p> <p>(TI=(contracts OR contract OR agreements OR agreement OR advertising OR advertisement OR advertisements OR marketing OR "Tobacco Industry") OR AB=(contracts OR contract OR agreements OR agreement OR advertising OR advertisement OR advertisements OR marketing OR "Tobacco Industry"))</p> <p>AND</p> <p>(TI=(store OR stores OR "point of sale" OR "points of sale" OR retail OR retailers OR retailer OR retailing OR shop OR "gas station" OR "gas stations" OR "point of purchase" OR</p>

	<p>"points of purchase" OR outlet OR outlets OR "milk bars" OR newsstands OR kiosk OR petrol OR garage OR garages OR "service station" OR "service stations" OR pharmacy OR pharmacies OR druggist OR druggists OR supermarket OR supermarkets OR grocers OR groceries OR hypermarket OR hypermarkets OR vendor OR vendors OR vending) OR AB=(store OR stores OR "point of sale" OR "points of sale" OR retail OR retailers OR retailer OR retailing OR shop OR "gas station" OR "gas stations" OR "point of purchase" OR "points of purchase" OR outlet OR outlets OR "milk bars" OR newsstands OR kiosk OR petrol OR garage OR garages OR "service station" OR "service stations" OR pharmacy OR pharmacies OR druggist OR druggists OR supermarket OR supermarkets OR grocers OR groceries OR hypermarket OR hypermarkets OR vendor OR vendors OR vending))</p>
Scopus	<p>(TITLE-ABS("tobacco") OR TITLE-ABS("cigarette*") OR INDEXTERMS("tobacco products"))</p> <p>AND</p> <p>(TITLE-ABS("contracts") OR TITLE-ABS("contract") OR TITLE-ABS("agreements") OR TITLE-ABS("agreement") OR TITLE-ABS("advertising") OR TITLE-ABS("advertisement") OR TITLE-ABS("advertisements") OR TITLE-ABS("marketing") OR INDEXTERMS("Tobacco Industry"))</p> <p>AND</p> <p>(TITLE-ABS("store") OR TITLE-ABS("stores") OR TITLE-ABS("point of sale") OR TITLE-ABS("points of sale") OR TITLE-ABS("retail") OR TITLE-ABS("retailers") OR TITLE-ABS("retailer") OR TITLE-ABS("retailing") OR TITLE-ABS("shop") OR TITLE-ABS("gas station") OR TITLE-ABS("gas stations") OR TITLE-ABS("point of purchase") OR TITLE-ABS("points of purchase") OR TITLE-ABS("outlet") OR TITLE-ABS("outlets") OR TITLE-ABS("milk bars") OR TITLE-ABS("newsstands") OR TITLE-ABS("kiosk") OR TITLE-ABS("petrol") OR TITLE-ABS("garage") OR TITLE-ABS("garages") OR TITLE-ABS("service station") OR TITLE-ABS("service stations") OR TITLE-ABS("pharmacy") OR TITLE-ABS("pharmacies") OR TITLE-ABS("druggist") OR TITLE-ABS("druggists") OR TITLE-ABS("supermarket") OR TITLE-</p>

	ABS("supermarkets") OR TITLE-ABS("grocers") OR TITLE-ABS("groceries") OR TITLE-ABS("hypermarket") OR TITLE-ABS("hypermarkets") OR TITLE-ABS("vendor") OR TITLE-ABS("vendors") OR TITLE-ABS("vending"))
ProQuest Political Science Database	<p>(ti(tobacco) or ab(tobacco) OR MAINSUBJECT.EXACT("Cigarettes") OR MAINSUBJECT.EXACT("Cigars") OR MAINSUBJECT.EXACT("Tobacco smoking"))</p> <p>AND</p> <p>(ti(contracts) or ab(contracts) OR ti(contract) OR ab(contract) OR ti(agreements) OR ab(agreements) OR ti(agreement) OR ab(agreement) OR ti(advertising) OR ab(advertising) OR ti(advertisement) OR ab(advertisement) OR ti(advertisements) OR ab(advertisements) OR ti(marketing) OR ab(marketing) OR MAINSUBJECT.EXACT("Tobacco industry"))</p> <p>AND</p> <p>(ti(store) OR ab(store) OR ti(stores) OR ab(stores) OR ti("point of sale") OR ab("point of sale") OR ti("points of sale") OR ab("points of sale") OR ti(retail) OR ab(retail) OR ti(retailers) OR ab(retailers) OR ti(retailer) OR ab(retailer) OR ti(retailing) OR ab(retailing) OR ti(shop) OR ab(shop) OR ti("gas station") OR ab("gas station") OR ti("gas stations") OR ab("gas stations") OR ti("point of purchase") OR ab("point of purchase") OR ti("points of purchase") OR ab("points of purchase") OR ti(outlet) OR ab(outlet) OR ti(outlets) OR ab(outlets) OR ti("milk bars") OR ab("milk bars") OR ti(newsstands) OR ab(newsstands) OR ti(kiosk) or ab(kiosk) OR ti(petrol) or ab(petrol) OR ti(garage) or ab(garage) OR ti(garages) or ab(garages) OR ti("service station") or ab("service station") OR ti("service stations") or ab("service stations") OR ti(pharmacy) or ab(pharmacy) OR ti(pharmacies) or ab(pharmacies) OR ti(druggist) or ab(druggist) OR ti(druggists) or ab(druggists) OR ti(supermarket) or ab(supermarket) OR ti(supermarkets) OR ab(supermarkets) OR ti(grocers) OR ab(grocers) OR ti(groceries) OR ab(groceries) OR ti(hypermarket) OR ab(hypermarket) OR ti(hypermarkets) OR ab(hypermarkets) OR ti(vendor) OR ab(vendor) OR ti(vendors) OR ab(vendors) OR ti(vending) OR ab(vending))</p>

EBSCO Business Source Premier	<p>(TI tobacco OR AB tobacco OR TI cigarette* OR AB cigarette* OR TI “tobacco products” OR AB “tobacco products”)</p> <p>AND</p> <p>(TI contracts OR AB contracts OR TI contract OR AB contract OR TI agreements OR AB agreements OR TI agreement OR AB agreement OR TI advertising OR AB advertising OR TI advertisement OR AB advertisement OR TI advertisements OR AB advertisements OR TI marketing OR AB marketing OR (DE "TOBACCO industry") OR (DE “TOBACCO advertising – Law & Legislation”))</p> <p>AND</p> <p>(TI store OR AB store OR TI stores OR AB stores OR TI “point of sale” OR AB “point of sale” OR TI “points of sale” OR AB “points of sale” OR TI retail OR AB retail OR TI retailers OR AB retailers OR TI retailer OR AB retailer OR TI retailing OR AB retailing OR TI shop OR AB shop OR TI “gas station” OR AB “gas station” OR TI “gas stations” OR AB “gas stations” OR TI “point of purchase” OR AB “point of purchase” OR TI “points of purchase” OR AB “points of purchase” OR TI outlet OR AB outlet OR TI outlets OR AB outlets OR TI “milk bars” OR AB “milk bars” OR TI newsstands OR AB newsstands OR TI kiosk OR AB kiosk OR TI petrol OR AB petrol OR TI garage OR AB garage OR TI garages OR AB garages OR TI “service station” OR AB “service station” OR TI “service stations” OR AB “service stations” OR TI pharmacy OR AB pharmacy OR TI pharmacies OR AB pharmacies OR TI druggist OR AB druggist OR TI druggists OR AB druggists OR TI supermarket OR AB supermarket OR TI supermarkets OR AB supermarkets OR TI grocers OR AB grocers OR TI groceries OR AB groceries OR TI hypermarket OR AB hypermarket OR TI hypermarkets OR AB hypermarkets OR TI vendor OR AB vendor OR TI vendors OR AB vendors OR TI vending OR AB vending)</p>
ProQuest Agricultural & Environmental Science Collection (ProQuest Thesaurus and Life Sciences Thesaurus)	<p>(ti(tobacco) or ab(tobacco) OR MAINSUBJECT.EXACT("Cigarettes") OR MAINSUBJECT.EXACT("Cigars") OR MAINSUBJECT.EXACT("Tobacco smoking"))</p>

	<p>AND</p> <p>(ti(contracts) OR ab(contracts) OR ti(contract) OR ab(contract) OR ti(agreements) OR ab(agreements) OR ti(agreement) OR ab(agreement) OR ti(advertising) OR ab(advertising) OR ti(advertisement) OR ab(advertisement) OR ti(advertisements) OR ab(advertisements) OR ti(marketing) OR ab(marketing) OR MAINSUBJECT.EXACT("Tobacco industry"))</p> <p>AND</p> <p>(ti(store) OR ab(store) OR ti(stores) OR ab(stores) OR ti("point of sale") OR ab("point of sale") OR ti("points of sale") OR ab("points of sale") OR ti(retail) OR ab(retail) OR ti(retailers) OR ab(retailers) OR ti(retailer) OR ab(retailer) OR ti(retailing) OR ab(retailing) OR ti(shop) OR ab(shop) OR ti("gas station") OR ab("gas station") OR ti("gas stations") OR ab("gas stations") OR ti("point of purchase") OR ab("point of purchase") OR ti("points of purchase") OR ab("points of purchase") OR ti(outlet) OR ab(outlet) OR ti(outlets) OR ab(outlets) OR ti("milk bars") OR ab("milk bars") OR ti(newsstands) OR ab(newsstands) OR ti(kiosk) OR ab(kiosk) OR ti(petrol) OR ab(petrol) OR ti(garage) OR ab(garage) OR ti(garages) OR ab(garages) OR ti("service station") OR ab("service station") OR ti("service stations") OR ab("service stations") OR ti(pharmacy) OR ab(pharmacy) OR ti(pharmacies) OR ab(pharmacies) OR ti(druggist) OR ab(druggist) OR ti(druggists) OR ab(druggists) OR ti(supermarket) OR ab(supermarket) OR ti(supermarkets) OR ab(supermarkets) OR ti(grocers) OR ab(grocers) OR ti(groceries) OR ab(groceries) OR ti(hypermarket) OR ab(hypermarket) OR ti(hypermarkets) OR ab(hypermarkets) OR ti(vendor) OR ab(vendor) OR ti(vendors) OR ab(vendors) OR ti(vending) OR ab(vending))</p>
EBSCO Global Health	<p>(TI tobacco OR AB tobacco OR (DE "Cigarettes") OR (DE "Tobacco smoking"))</p> <p>AND</p> <p>(TI contracts OR AB contracts OR TI contract OR AB contract OR TI agreements OR AB agreements OR TI agreement OR AB agreement OR TI advertising OR AB advertising OR TI advertisement OR AB advertisement OR</p>

	<p>TI advertisements OR AB advertisements OR TI marketing OR AB marketing OR (DE "tobacco industry"))</p> <p>AND</p> <p>(TI store OR AB store OR TI stores OR AB stores OR TI “point of sale” OR AB “point of sale” OR TI “points of sale” OR AB “points of sale” OR TI retail OR AB retail OR TI retailers OR AB retailers OR TI retailer OR AB retailer OR TI retailing OR AB retailing OR TI shop OR AB shop OR TI “gas station” OR AB “gas station” OR TI “gas stations” OR AB “gas stations” OR TI “point of purchase” OR AB “point of purchase” OR TI “points of purchase”) OR AB “points of purchase” OR TI outlet OR AB outlet OR TI outlets OR AB outlets OR TI “milk bars” OR AB “milk bars” OR TI newsstands OR AB newsstands OR TI kiosk OR AB kiosk OR TI petrol OR AB petrol OR TI garage OR AB garage OR TI garages OR AB garages OR TI “service station” OR AB “service station” OR TI “service stations” OR AB “service stations” OR TI pharmacy OR AB pharmacy OR TI pharmacies OR AB pharmacies OR TI druggist OR AB druggist OR TI druggists OR AB druggists OR TI supermarket OR AB supermarket OR TI supermarkets OR AB supermarkets OR TI grocers OR AB grocers OR TI groceries OR AB groceries OR TI hypermarket OR AB hypermarket OR TI hypermarkets OR AB hypermarkets OR TI vendor OR AB vendor OR TI vendors OR AB vendors OR TI vending OR AB vending)</p>
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Supplemental Table 2. Evidence table organized by year of publication.

First author, year	Location (year of data collection)	Purpose	Sample description and size	Study methods	Description of contract or agreement	Contract prevalence by retailer (%)	Contract incentives and requirements	Contract impact on retail environment
Cummings 1991¹	Buffalo, NY, U.S. (1987)	Assess tobacco advertising at the POS and determine its prevalence in the retail setting	Simple random sample of packaged goods retail store owners and managers (n=61)	Descriptive analysis of in-store interviews and store audit data	Receipt of monetary incentives for displaying tobacco advertising	Two-thirds of the owners and managers reported receiving incentives (~66%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monetary rewards • Required to display tobacco company and product advertising 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tobacco stores that sold tobacco for profit (rather than as a traffic builder) were more likely to receive monetary incentives • Fewer tobacco stores that sold for profit were willing to display anti-tobacco signs than stores that sold as a traffic builder
Feighery 1999²	Santa Clara County, CA, U.S. (1997)	Examine how industry incentives for tobacco products compare to incentives for other products	Random sample of small retail store owners and managers fluent in English that promoted and sold tobacco products (n=108)	Quantitative analysis of store observations and telephone interview data	Retailer incentive programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 62% of stores received slotting/display allowances • 24% received trade allowances 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Slotting fees given to retailers • Allowances for marketing materials and displays • Average incentive value: \$204.51/month • Required to have in-store displays • Required to follow specific tobacco product placement (i.e., prominent locations) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tobacco products promoted on in-store displays and placed in prominent locations • A greater percent of small retail store owners reported receiving incentives from tobacco manufacturers than food and beverage manufacturers
Weinbaum 1999³	California, U.S. (1996-1997)	Examine tobacco retailer policies, beliefs, and perceptions in relation to changing youth tobacco access laws	A subsample of tobacco retail store managers from the Youth Tobacco Purchase Survey (YTPS) 1996 dataset (n=320)	Thematic analysis of telephone interviews paired with secondary analysis of the Youth Tobacco Purchase Survey (YTPS) 1996 dataset	Discounts or incentives to display tobacco promotional materials.	34% received discounts or incentives to display promotional materials for tobacco	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discounted tobacco products • Monetary rewards • Free promotional display units • Required to display promotional material 	NR

Bloom 2001⁴	U.S. (NR)	Identify how slotting fees and tobacco industry promotions altered the retail environment	Tobacco retailers (n=5) and authors of other tobacco retail reports (n=4)	Description of in-store tobacco retailer observations and telephone interviews	Relationship marketing, cooperative merchandising agreements, Philip Morris Retail Leaders Program.	NR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buydowns • Slotting fees given to retailers • Volume discount • Free or discounted equipment (i.e., display cases) and entertainment (i.e., NASCAR tickets) • Payment amount to the retailer based on the number of requirements met • Reportedly, convenience stores could make the cash equivalence of \$20,000/year • Required to follow specific tobacco product placement (e.g., behind the counter or self-service (dependent on local policies), at a specific height) • Required to reserve a specific number of shelf facings for all products and space for new products • Required to display in-store advertising • Required to use tobacco company-set prices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased displays and POS advertising • Growth of specialty "tobacco-only" retailers • Increased variation and lower prices over time • Self-service: Philip Morris pays more to stop this selling technique, other manufacturers pay more to keep it • Financial incentives and promotions from tobacco companies increases the likelihood retailers would be "vocal allies"
Lee 2001⁵	California, U.S. (2000)	Determine the effects of community-level bans on self-service tobacco displays and customer	Random sample of stores that sell tobacco and performed contract negotiations (n=198)	Quantitative analysis of in-store interview data	Contracts negotiated between retailers and tobacco sales representatives	More than half of the retailers reported receiving incentives (57%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buydowns • Discounted products • Monetary rewards (average value over 3 months = \$236) • Free goods with orders 	Retailers with self-service tobacco displays were more likely to experience shoplifting and to receive incentives from tobacco manufacturers

		tobacco accessibility on the retail environment and merchants						
Carter 2003⁶	Australia (2003)	Understand the relationship between the retail environment and cigarette marketing	Tobacco industry documents (n=172), retail trade publications, and cigarette advertisements (n=44)	Content analysis of qualitative data in tobacco industry, and related articles and advertisements	Partnerships with retailers to build business	NR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buydowns/rebates • Rewards given to retailers redeemable at tobacco manufacturer hosted events (e.g., Philip Morris “Longbeach dollars” for Philip Morris auction nights) • Price supports • Free or discounted equipment (i.e., display cases), manufacturing, and maintenance • Professional support for merchandising • Required to follow store-layout and design for marketing and product placement specified in planogram 	Creation of distribution hubs pairing tobacco distribution with other goods like drinks, sweets, and convenience foods
Feighery 2003⁷	21 states, U.S. (2001)	Understand the incentive programs between tobacco manufacturers and retailers, and how they impact the retail environment. Identify potential visual indicators of retailer program participation	Convenience sample of owners or managers of independent stores or retail chain locations identified through Yahoo! Yellow Pages (n=29)	Thematic analysis of telephone interviews	Retailer incentive programs	Most retailers participated in multiple incentive programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buydowns • Volume discounts (i.e., \$0.35/pack for 45% of retail space agreement) • Allowances for marketing materials and displays • Required to adhere to standards for sales volume • Required to display tobacco company signage • Required to follow specific tobacco 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encouraged tobacco sales; the larger volume of tobacco products sold, the more money retailers receive • Decreased tobacco prices: “None of my product goes on sale unless the sales rep requests [it]” • Differential store visuals: stores with contracts display discounted prices, clearly mark shelves,

							product placement and percent (i.e., 45%) of products on displays and shelves <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Required to follow store-layout and design for marketing and product placement specified in planogram • Required to use tobacco company-set prices • Barred from selling competing brands that retail for lower prices 	and prominently display tobacco products
Feighery 2004⁸	15 states, U.S. (2001)	Determine the extent to which retailers participate in incentive programs with tobacco manufacturers, and how the programs influence tobacco product amount, placement, marketing, and pricing in the retail setting	Stratified cluster sample of retailers identified as selling tobacco by SIC codes and telephone confirmation (n=468)	Secondary quantitative analysis of store audit, compliance check, and telephone interview transcript data	Retailer incentive programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 65% of retailers participated in one or more incentive programs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monetary rewards • Required to follow specific tobacco product placement (i.e., cigarettes near the POS and prominent locations) • Required to follow store-layout and design specified in marketing diagram • Required to display cigarette advertising 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased marketing material for manufacturer the contract was with • Impact varied by which manufacturer the contract was with • Participating retailers displayed more (14.0 vs. 7.4) tobacco advertising materials in store than non-participating stores • Encouraged tobacco sales; the larger volume of tobacco products sold, the more money retailers receive • Retailers with Lorillard contracts offered significantly cheaper Newport cigarettes than retailers without Lorillard contracts
Feighery 2005⁹	15 states, U.S. (2001)	Determine whether state-level minimum	Stratified cluster sample of retailers in communities of \geq	Multi-level analysis of retail tobacco prices at	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contracts like the Philip Morris 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buydowns: 66% of stores in states 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buydowns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Neither contract prevalence or cigarette prices varied by state-

		cigarette price laws are undermined by tobacco retail incentive programs	25,000 people, identified as tobacco retailers by SIC codes and telephone confirmation (n=apx.1500)	the store- and state-level	Retail Leaders Program <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two cigarette company incentive programs: buydowns and master-type volume discount contracts 	without minimum price laws, 55% of stores in states with minimum price laws <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Master-type contracts: 61% of stores in states without minimum price laws, 49% of stores in states with minimum price laws 		level minimum cigarette price law status <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tobacco retail incentive programs may undermine minimum price laws
Lavack 2006¹⁰	U.S. (NR)	Examine why and how tobacco companies have implemented POS promotion	Tobacco industry documents (n=260)	Thematic analysis using sorting methodology	Promotional incentive programs between tobacco companies and retailers	NR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monetary rewards (e.g., \$3/row on up to 25 rows) Free or discounted equipment (i.e., display cases) and maintenance Required to follow specific tobacco product placement, percent, promotions, and display patterns (e.g., minimally and exclusively the top two shelves, at eye-level, ends of aisles, POS) across the store as specified in the planogram Required to adhere to standards for sales volume (i.e., ≥ 100 cartons and minimum of 17 cartons of R.J. Reynolds sold/week) 	Encouraged tobacco sales; the larger volume of tobacco products sold, the more money retailers receive

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Required to carry and distribute products of all price-tiers • Visits from tobacco company representatives to ensure contract is followed 	
Yerger 2007¹¹	U.S. (2005-2006)	Describe how tobacco companies competed for inner city urban core business in the 1970s-1990s	Tobacco industry documents (n>400)	Qualitative analysis of tobacco industry tactics for targeting inner city consumers	Retailer programs	NR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monetary rewards (i.e., \$20-\$40; monthly payments) • Sweepstakes and large prizes (i.e., Cadillac Vehicle) • Free gifts • Free tobacco products • Free promotional display units specially made for small retail stores • Required to prominently display specific brands and products • Required to display promotional tobacco signs and products (i.e., signs featuring African American models) 	Increased promotion and visibility of menthol tobacco products in inner city urban cores
Feighery 2009¹²	California, U.S. (2007)	Identify the impact of the Philip Morris policy, sanctioning retailers that sell tobacco to minors, on retail tobacco prices and promotion	Philip Morris tobacco retailers found guilty of illegally selling tobacco products to minors in 2006 (n=185)	Two time-points (pre- and post-sanction) analysis of retail tobacco prices and promotions	Philip Morris Retail Leaders Program	109 of the 196 stores that sold tobacco to minors had a contract (56%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resources and support for merchandising and promotions • Barred from selling to minors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contract sanctions for retailers found guilty of selling tobacco to minors had no impact on cigarette prices or in-store promotional material

John 2009¹³	Oklahoma County, OK, U.S. (NR)	Understand tobacco advertising, industry tactics, and who has the power over store signage and placement in the retail setting	Random sample of retailers paying tobacco taxes (quantitative data: n=110; qualitative data: n=9)	Quantitative analysis of store audit data and thematic analysis of in-store interviews	Contractual arrangements with stores involving financial incentives and product advertisement	All of the interviewees (100%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buydowns/rebates (\$8-9/carton) • Volume discounts • Required to follow specific tobacco product shelving and overall placement • Required to have specific in-store displays • Visits from tobacco company representatives to ensure contract provisions were implemented • Tobacco company representatives had full control over displays, shelving, advertising, and promotional materials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Store success depends on contracts: “[If you don’t comply] they would just yank the contract and you are out of business” • Product promotions associated with contracts depended on customer base
Rooke 2010¹⁴	London and Nottingham, UK (2009)	Study tobacco displays at POS and determine the extent to which they are tobacco industry funded	Random sample of tobacco retailers (n=113), retail-related press published in 2009	Descriptive analysis of in-store interviews and retail-related press	Contractual obligations, incentives, and pressure from tobacco companies	Nearly four out of five retailers with tobacco-industry incentives had to follow specified conditions (79%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monetary rewards and local store vouchers • Free cigarette packs • Product offers on promotional items • Small gifts (i.e., pens) • Free or discounted equipment (i.e., display cases) • Visits from tobacco company representatives to ensure contract is followed • Tobacco company representatives had full control over tobacco product displays 	Retailers stocked more tobacco products than they would have chosen to on their own

Lee 2014¹⁵	South Korea (2009-2011)	Identify the strategies transnational tobacco companies used to increase their market presence in South Korea and how these strategies impacted the tobacco industry and public health in South Korea	Tobacco industry documents (n=456)	Qualitative content analysis interpreted alongside social and historical contexts (hermeneutics)	Cooperative relationships with convenience stores	NR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Slotting fees given to retailers (equivalent to thousands of US Dollars) • Subsidies • Free samples and discounted products • Small gifts (i.e., lighters) that can be sold for income • Required to display products in prominent locations • Required to display POS posters and materials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased promotion of tobacco products • Competition between brands led to threats against retailers in regard to license renewal • Developed relationships between retailers and manufacturers
Chan 2015¹⁶	Oklahoma, U.S. (2008)	Explore voluntary retailer support for reducing the number of tobacco advertisements	Locally owned convenience store owners and managers that sell tobacco products, identified through local tobacco coalitions, personal networks, and other retailers (n=22)	Thematic analysis of in-store and telephone interviews	Tobacco company incentive programs	21 out of 22 stores had a contract (95%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Required to display tobacco company and product advertising • “You don’t want to violate the contract” (p. 703) 	Retailers were willing to remove only non-contractual tobacco advertisements from the POS
Robertson 2015¹⁷	New Zealand (2014)	Examine retailers’ perceptions and relationships with the tobacco industry	Stratified sample of tobacco retailers representing various store types (n=21)	Qualitative description of semi-structured, in-store interviews	Rebate agreement between the tobacco industry and the retailer	“Most participants”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monetary rewards • Required to stock specific brands • Required to follow specific tobacco product placement 	NR
Pinard 2016¹⁸	15 rural counties in Nebraska, U.S. (2014)	Assess rural storeowners’ beliefs and practices that influence their sustainability and ability to encourage	Convenience sample of small rural food retailers (n=15)	Qualitative analysis of semi-structured, in-store interviews using grounded theory	Manufacturer and distributor agreements	“The vast majority accepted [contracts] as common practice and a “necessary evil” of doing business”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Required to follow specific tobacco product placement and percent (e.g., minimally and exclusively the top two shelves) of products on displays and shelves 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retailers stocked and promoted less healthy products due to manufacturer pressures

		healthy food choices					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Required to follow specific store-layout • Required to display specific tobacco company signage 	
Hwang 2018¹⁹	Seoul city and Gyeonggi province, South Korea (NR)	Collect information on contractual agreements related to tobacco products	Random sample of male convenience store owners (n=3)	Thematic analysis of semi-structured, in-store interviews	Specific relationship between tobacco companies and convenience stores	All store owners reported contracts (100%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monetary rewards • Volume discounts • Allowances for advertising • Free samples on new products • Free or discounted equipment (i.e., display cases) and maintenance • Required to reserve a specific number of shelving units for tobacco company products • Required to display a specific number of tobacco advertisements • Required to adhere to overall tobacco brand appearance with both advertisements and displays • Visits from tobacco company representatives to ensure contract was followed 	Contractual advertisements and displays are individually created to target local customers
Stead 2018²⁰	Four communities, Scotland, UK (2015-2016)	Explore retailer relationships with tobacco companies and their experiences with implementing tobacco display bans	Stratified sample of small, independent tobacco retailers (n=24)	Thematic analysis of semi-structured, in-store interviews	Retailer partnerships or loyalty schemes	23 of 24 retailers had a contract (96%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monetary rewards (i.e., £250/year • Gifts (e.g., hospitality, iPads, business equipment) • Free samples of new products • Free or discounted equipment (i.e., display units) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encouraged tobacco sales; the larger volume of tobacco products sold, the more money retailers receive • Verbal advertising for specific brands under an advertising ban

							maintenance and updates (e.g., to adhere to updated display policies) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Required to follow store-layout and design for marketing and product placement specified in planogram • Required to display a retail tobacco unit • Required to maintain tobacco product availability • Required to dedicate a percent of retail space to specific tobacco brands (i.e., two-thirds of the unit space) • Required to promote and prominently display specific brands and products • Barred from stocking or displaying competing brands • Tobacco company representative visits and mystery shopping from tobacco company representatives to ensure contract is followed • Tobacco company representatives encouraged employees to verbally promote specific products to customers 	
Welker 2018²¹	Indonesia (2007; 2014; 2015-2016)	Describe the tobacco retail environment in Indonesia and	Tobacco retailers, marketing managers, marketing contractors, market	Ethnographic analysis of data collected from visits to	Retail program requiring retailers to adhere to	NR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monetary rewards • Free or discounted building maintenance and upkeep 	Retail environment is saturated with tobacco advertising

		how it interacts with a major tobacco company	retailers and customers, meeting attendees and leaders (n=NR)	retailers, interviews with retailers and marketing managers, and attending markets and meetings for tobacco retailers	tobacco company requirements		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Free business plan consultation • Free or discounted health insurance for retail owners and up to three family members • Free or discounted merchandise and gifts (e.g., calculators, blenders, home goods) • Required to expand product offerings • Required to adopt “modern” retail characteristics (e.g., visible price labels, expiration dates, electronic signs, colorful shelving) • Required to display street advertisements 	
Callard 2019²²	Four Quebec municipalities, Canada (2017)	Determine the effect of banning tobacco company incentive programs on cigarette prices	Tobacco company websites and all convenience stores selling tobacco in the area confirmed by store audits (n=273)	Content analysis of tobacco company websites and quantitative description of single time point store audits	Tobacco industry retailer programs	0% due to local ban	NR	Even after contracts were banned in the area, prices continued to vary for the same products in different stores, indicating that manufacturer pricing techniques continue to lower the cost of tobacco and blunt tax increases
Chavez 2019²³	San Francisco, CA, U.S. (2017)	Explore corner store owner perspectives in neighborhoods with high tobacco retailer density	Convenience sample of independent, family-owned convenience store owners and managers (n=38)	Qualitative content analysis of open-ended in-store interviews	Financial incentives from tobacco companies to sell and advertise certain products	7 out of 38 stores had a contract (18%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buydowns • Tobacco company representatives discontinued in-store visits 	Retailers with contracts placed buydown coupons directly on tobacco product packaging
Apollonio 2020²⁴	U.S. (2018)	Evaluate the relationship between tobacco	Tobacco industry documents and court cases released	Qualitative Content analysis of tobacco	Sales rebates and pricing agreements between tobacco	NR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buydowns • Paperless coupons 	Stores bordering high-tax jurisdictions tend to have excessive displays and

		industry price promotion and state tobacco taxes	between 1987-2016 (n~90)	industry documents and related articles	companies and retailers (paperless coupons)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Niche promotions” for border stores • Required to display tobacco company promotions 	price promotions for tobacco products
D’Angelo 2020²⁵	4 cities, U.S. (2013-2014)	Examine small food retailer perceptions of tobacco industry contracts	Convenience sample of small food store owners and managers in low-income neighborhoods (n=63)	Convergent parallel mixed methods design collected qualitative and quantitative data through in-store merchant interviews	Tobacco industry requirements of retailers in return for financial incentives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 87% of retailers had a formal contract with tobacco distributors • 95% reported receiving incentives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buydowns • Slotting fees given to retailers • Monetary rewards • Free marketing materials and displays • Free or discounted products • Median incentive value: \$930/year • Required to follow specific tobacco product placement • Tobacco company representatives had full control over displays, shelving, advertising, and promotional materials • Required to use tobacco company-set prices • Visits from tobacco industry representatives to ensure contract was followed • Tobacco company representatives encouraged employees to verbally promote specific products to customers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retailers can sell tobacco products at low prices and set competitive pricing for their local area • Small stores need contracts to remain competitive with tobacco prices compared to larger stores • Particular tobacco manufacturers monopolized contracts in different areas based on demographics (e.g., Lorillard (Newport Menthol) contracts in Baltimore, a city with 60% Black residents)
Watts 2020a²⁶	3 states, Australia (2018)	Identify the tobacco industry incentives given to and	Random sample of current tobacco retailers that decide at the store-level to	Thematic analysis of open-ended responses to	Benefits in exchange for doing something for the tobacco company	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 266 retailers reported tobacco company 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Free or discounted equipment (i.e., price lists) 	NR

		requirements expected of tobacco retailers	sell tobacco and do not sell alcohol (n=800)	structured telephone interviews		benefits in exchange for doing something (33%) • 110 of the retailers who reported tobacco companies providing them with shelving units or displays agreed to do something in return (30%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Required to promote and prominently display specific brands and products • Required to dedicate a percent of retail space to specific tobacco brands • Required to maintain tobacco product availability Required to stock specific brands 	
Watts 2020b²⁷	Australia (2019)	Understand tobacco company promotional strategies used in the retail setting	Convenience sample of individuals who previously worked in sales or marketing for one of four tobacco companies operating in Australia (n=4)	Thematic analysis of responses to either in-person or online teleconference semi-structured interviews	Contractual trading terms between tobacco companies and retailers	NR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monetary rewards and gift cards • Allowances for marketing and related expenses • Free or discounted merchandise • Free samples of tobacco products • Exclusive parties for retailers • Vacations highest performing retailers • Tickets to sporting and music events • Meeting sponsorships (e.g., sponsorship of the Independent Grocers Association conference) • Retailer education opportunities (e.g., face-to-face meetings and off-site events covering new products and highlighting sales) 	Verbal advertising for specific brands under an advertising ban

							<ul style="list-style-type: none">• “Once-in-a-lifetime opportunities” (e.g., paddle boarding around glaciers, driving exotic cars)• Required to follow specific tobacco product promotion and display patters (e.g., at eye-level)• Required to offer full tobacco product range• Tobacco company representatives encouraged employees to verbally promote specific products to customers	
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Note: NR=Not reported. POS=Point-of-Sale. SIC= Standard Industrial Classification.

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