It is totally true that tobacco control is funded very little
compared to the profits derived by the tobacco companies and the taxes
collected by governments.
At one point (in the 80s?), WHO had suggested that 1% of the tobacco taxes
be allocated to fund tobacco control activities. Then this suggestion
"disappeared": I wonder if you know why as it would be a simple request
that remains valid.
It is totally true that tobacco control is funded very little
compared to the profits derived by the tobacco companies and the taxes
collected by governments.
At one point (in the 80s?), WHO had suggested that 1% of the tobacco taxes
be allocated to fund tobacco control activities. Then this suggestion
"disappeared": I wonder if you know why as it would be a simple request
that remains valid.
It is also true that Bloomberg and Gates have provided since 2007 and
2008 a significant amount of money to promote tobacco control worldwide:
500 millions is not small change (325 millions from Bloomberg and 125
millions from Gates). How has this money been used? I don't think I have
seen yet a detailed evaluation. Is that normal?
Philippe Boucher
Tobacco Control in Africa - The investigative blog
http://blogsofbainbridge.typepad.com/africa
PS: I should add that when French people were polled and asked if
they were in favor of taking 1% of the tobacco taxers to fund tobacco
control activities they were overwhelmingly in favor (including smokers)
but that was not the opinion of the Finance Ministry
In this paper, Mejia et al run a number of Monte Carlo simulations
based on a set of totally unrealistic assumptions to reach the conclusion
that promoting smokeless tobacco as a safer alternative to cigarettes is
unlikely to result in substantial health benefits at a population level.
In their analysis, Mejia et al do not consider the potential impact on the
current adult smokers who will account for virtually all of the...
In this paper, Mejia et al run a number of Monte Carlo simulations
based on a set of totally unrealistic assumptions to reach the conclusion
that promoting smokeless tobacco as a safer alternative to cigarettes is
unlikely to result in substantial health benefits at a population level.
In their analysis, Mejia et al do not consider the potential impact on the
current adult smokers who will account for virtually all of the tobacco-
related illness and death in the United States over the next 20 years.
While recognizing that smokeless tobacco is far less hazardous than
cigarettes, they fail to consider the health consciousness of American
smokers that have led almost half to light cigarettes in recent decades,
and failed to consider the potential impact of honestly informing the
American public about the difference in risk posed by smokeless tobacco
products, as compared to cigarettes. All of their data on switching rates
in the United States is conditioned on the warning on smokeless tobacco
products, in place in the USA since 1984, that this product is not a safe
alternative to cigarettes. This purposely misleading warning has left over
80% of American smokers with the incorrect impression that smokeless
tobacco products present the same risk of tobacco-related illness and
death as cigarettes. Elimination of this warning, followed by honest and
effective health education could transform American attitudes toward
smokeless tobacco, especially among smokers unable or unwilling to quit.
I find the following points problematic in the Mejia paper:
1. Harm reduction, by definition, means encouraging current users to use a
less toxic product. In this study, Mejia et al do not consider the
potential benefits to current smokers.
2. In the scoring of health effects, cigarettes are set at an arbitrary
figure of 100. Smokeless tobacco products to be used for harm reduction
should be scored at a level of 0.1 to 2.0, not 11 as in this study.1
3. For dual users, the score is arbitrarily set at 90, anticipating very
little substitution of the lower risk product for cigarettes. A range of
figures between 20 and 50 would have been more reasonable for the Monte
Carlo simulations.
4. In their transition models for persons who initiate smoking, their
transition rates to smokeless tobacco products, by scenario range from
zero to 20.4% (to 30.1% when dual use is considered). All things
considered, if the misleading warning is eliminated and effective health
education follows, a range of 20% to 50% would be more reasonable; up to
80% if dual use is considered.
Given all of these factors, the Tobacco Control Task Force of the American
Association of Public Health Physicians (AAPHP), after an extensive
literature review and policy analysis1 concluded the following:
1. The possibility now exists to save the lives of 4 million of the 8
million current adult American smokers who will otherwise die of a tobacco
-related illness over the next 20 years (400,000 per year times 20 years).
The harm reduction policy based on encouraging smokers to switch to
selected low risk smokeless tobacco products should also eliminate the
vast majority of the 40,000 deaths per year attributed to environmental
tobacco smoke. Such a policy is likely to result in a situation 20 years
from now in which tobacco-related deaths, now in excess of 440,000 per
year will be less than 40,000 per year in the United States, with most of
the remaining deaths among persons who still chose to continue smoking
conventional cigarettes.
2. The only feasible way to achieve this public health benefit will be to
honestly inform current smokers who are unable or unwilling to quit that
they could cut their risk of tobacco-related illness and death by 98% or
better by switching to one of a number of very-low-risk smokeless tobacco
products or E-cigarettes. Such an approach constitutes a harm reduction
policy based on commercially available smokeless tobacco and other non-
pharmaceutical nicotine delivery products.
3. The impact such a harm reduction policy would have on the numbers of
teens initiating tobacco use would depend on how the policy is
implemented. FDA regulation of marketing of tobacco products under the new
law, in collaboration with public health educational programming by FDA
and others, should make it possible to implement the harm reduction policy
as recommended above without increasing, and possibly while decreasing,
the numbers of teens initiating tobacco use.
4. The currently available science gives us very good reason to believe on
a basis of far more likely than not, that such a harm reduction initiative
will achieve the desired public health benefits among smokers.
5. The studies needed to definitively prove such benefits are impossible
to conduct by any means other than implementing the policy and carefully
tracking booth process and outcomes. Requiring such proof in advance is
both scientifically untenable and will predictably result in such a policy
never being implemented.
6. The best that can be hoped from current FDA and other federal agency
tobacco control policies is very small changes in annual tobacco-related
death rates and very small reductions in teen smoking rates.
Reference
1. Nitzkin JL, Rodu B. AAPHP Resolution and White Paper: The Case for Harm
Reduction for Control of Tobacco-related Illness and Death
[http://www.aaphp.org/special/joelstobac/20081026HarmReductionResolutionAsPassed1.pdf]
. In: AAPHP Tobacco Issues, 26/October, 2008. 3Aug2010.
How might those estimates change if we all told smokers the truth?
What if the government changed the warning labels to read "THIS
PRODUCT IS NOT A 100% SAFE ALTERNATIVE TO SMOKING"? See what a difference
one tiny change can make? This would lead folks to ask, "Well if it's not
100% safe, how much safer is it?"
The way the message is worded now, 85% of the people who read it
conclude it means that...
How might those estimates change if we all told smokers the truth?
What if the government changed the warning labels to read "THIS
PRODUCT IS NOT A 100% SAFE ALTERNATIVE TO SMOKING"? See what a difference
one tiny change can make? This would lead folks to ask, "Well if it's not
100% safe, how much safer is it?"
The way the message is worded now, 85% of the people who read it
conclude it means that smokeless tobacco products cause just as much
disease and premature deaths as smoking. [1] We know it isn't true. But
smokers don't know that.
And then what if the American Cancer Society, American Heart
Association, American Lung Association, American Medical Society, and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention informed smokers that their
excess risk of lung disease would be totally eliminated if they switched
from smoking to smokeless? What if they provided comparisons between
smoking and smokeless of the odds of developing various types cancers,
having a heart attack or a stroke?
We know that users of smokeless tobacco products have a lower
mortality rate from all these diseases than continuing smokers. [2,3] We
know that for most diseases, the Swedish snus user's mortality risks are
reduced to the level of those who gave up all use of tobacco. [4] We know
all that. But the smokers do not know that.
Most smokers do not read medical journals. They rely on the popular
press and information provided by respected organizations that claim to
have public health as a mission.
Curiously, most physicians are just as misinformed as their smoking
patients. What if the doctors were to learn that their patients could
reduce their risk of developing a smoking-related disease by 90 to 99% if
they switch completely to a smokeless form of tobacco? Might not more
smokers give snus a try if their own doctor told them it was safer than
smoking?
What if the FDA required the tobacco companies to develop and conduct
advertising campaigns aimed at convincing smokers to switch to smokeless
products?
What if we did all these things? What effect would that have on the
number of U.S. smokers who switch and consequently on the smoking-related
morbidity and mortality rates? Factor in truth-telling and run those
Monte Carlo simulations again.
References:
[1] Phillips, C.V. et al. You might as well smoke; the misleading
and harmful public message about smokeless tobacco. BMC Public Health
2005, 5:31doi:10.1186/1471-2458-5-31.
[2] Accortt, N.A., et al. Chronic Disease Mortality in a Cohort of
Smokeless Tobacco Users. American Journal of Epidemiology 2002; 156:730-
737
[3] Roth, H.D. et al. Health Risks of Smoking Compared to Swedish
Snus. Inhalation Toxicology, 17:741-748, 2005.
[4] Gartner C.E, et al., Assessment of Swedish snus for tobacco harm
reduction: an epidemiological modeling study. Lancet. 2007 Jun
16;369(9578):2010-4
Glantz et al conclude that "Promoting smokeless tobacco as a safer alternative to
cigarettes is unlikely to result in substantial health benefits at a
population level."
Obviously Glantz is not up to speed on Sweden. It has the lowest
incidence of lung cancer in the developed world because so many smokers
have switched to snus.
"Results: There were 172,000 lung cancer deaths among men in the EU
in 200...
Glantz et al conclude that "Promoting smokeless tobacco as a safer alternative to
cigarettes is unlikely to result in substantial health benefits at a
population level."
Obviously Glantz is not up to speed on Sweden. It has the lowest
incidence of lung cancer in the developed world because so many smokers
have switched to snus.
"Results: There were 172,000 lung cancer deaths among men in the EU
in 2002. If all EU countries had the LCMR of men in Sweden, there would
have been 92,000 (54%) fewer deaths." In conclusion it further adds "This
study shows that snus use has had a profound effect on smoking prevalence
and LCMRs among Swedish men. While it cannot be proven that snus would
have the same effect in other EU countries, the potential reduction in
smoking-attributable deaths is considerable. " This study says "the health
risks associated with snus are lower than those associated with smoking.
Specifically, this is true for lung cancer (based on one study), for oral
cancer (based on one study), for gastric cancer (based on one study), for
cardiovascular disease (based on three of four studies), and for all-cause
mortality (based on one study)."
The consequences in Sweden are that in the UK LC is running at 64.7
persons per 100,000 and in Sweden it is 30, with 50% of Swedish men
switching to snus. Ergo half the LC. My provenance is indeed the anti
smoking Cancer Research.
I read with interest your article affirming public support in England
for dedicated cigarette price increases and especially highlighting the
finding that almost 50% of smokers supported the measure.
As proposed by the authors, the support for the
price hike seems likely to be contingent on allocating funds to tobacco
control activities (Surveys from United States, Australia, New Zealand and
several European and...
I read with interest your article affirming public support in England
for dedicated cigarette price increases and especially highlighting the
finding that almost 50% of smokers supported the measure.
As proposed by the authors, the support for the
price hike seems likely to be contingent on allocating funds to tobacco
control activities (Surveys from United States, Australia, New Zealand and
several European and Asian countries show this). Why else would a non-
smoker be keen on increasing the price of a product he or she does not
even use? Or would anyone who uses a product regularly 'simply' favour
increasing its price without a reason (understanding that it would only
create a bigger hole in his or her pocket)?
Arguments exist that dedication of tobacco taxes for tobacco control
activities not only serves as a means to muster support for increasing
taxes, but is also a very effective investment with a high return (1).
Now, understanding a non-smoker's perspective for this support may be
easy... Smoking is clearly a public health hazard and any steps to help
restrict or reduce the same would be very welcome. But understanding a
consumer's support for making his 'favourite' product more expensive is
definitely more complex.
Can this support from smokers be taken as an indication of an
indirect help-seeking behaviour? (After all, a large majority of smokers
who stop smoking do so without any form of assistance (2))
Or is it merely a 'Feel Good' factor which is the undercurrent?
Imagine this: A smoker buys a pack of cigarettes (obviously with
the intention to smoke) but says, 'I'm willing to throw in an extra 20p to
help control smoking'! Isn't it easier to say that I'll instead smoke one
cigarette less (thereby directly protecting myself, my family and the
public from this huge health hazard)?
A similar study from China (3), the world's largest producer and
consumer of tobacco, which analysed attitudes and behaviour towards
tobacco control activities, mirrored the results of this study, revealing
good support for increasing tobacco taxation (about 70%); but when the
intention to change smoking behaviour was measured independently, the
proportion of respondents who intended to change behaviour was only about
25%. Another study from New Zealand (4) however, revealed a significant
association between the strength of intention to quit and the support for
increasing taxation.
The second issue is that of bias. It has been found that people
answering surveys involving moral/ethical dilemmas have a tendency to
agree more with answers that are deemed 'morally' correct or in agreement
with the view of the majority or in other words, answers which people
'want to hear'.
So, considering the above issues, is this support from smokers
genuinely a form of help-seeking behaviour?
The answer to the above question remains intriguing.
Perhaps there should be a proposal to make cigarette packs priced the
same, but containing one cigarette less. And the cost of that cigarette
'given up for the good cause' could be used for tobacco control
activities. And then a survey could be conducted, examining support for that
(indirect) price hike.
2. Chapman S, MacKenzie R: The Global Research Neglect of Unassisted
Smoking Cessation: Causes and Consequences (2010). PLoS Med 7(2):
e1000216. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000216.
3. Wilson N, Weerasekera D, Edwards R, Thomson G, Devlin M, Gifford
H: Characteristics of smoker support for increasing a dedicated tobacco
tax: National survey data from New Zealand. Nicotine & Tobacco
Research 2010 12(2):168-173.
4. Yang T, Wu Y, Abdullah A, Dai D, Li F, Wu J, Xiang H: Attitudes
and behavioral response toward key tobacco control measures from the FCTC
among Chinese urban residents. BMC Public Health 2007, 7:248.
- Dr. Jonas S. Sundarakumar, M.B.,B.S., D.P.M., (MRCPsych)
Re:
Africa/Canada: BAT Director on Aid Board Spurs Boycott
Tobacco Control. June 2010, Vol 19, No 3, pp. 175-176
Reference is made in the above-noted article to a 15 October 1996
memo written by Shabanji Opukah (1) of British-American
Tobacco(BAT)claiming that "one of the IMASCO Directors sits on the IDRC
Board!" In fact, Mr. Opukah erred in this statement. A thorough review of
the Annual Reports of both IMASCO...
Re:
Africa/Canada: BAT Director on Aid Board Spurs Boycott
Tobacco Control. June 2010, Vol 19, No 3, pp. 175-176
Reference is made in the above-noted article to a 15 October 1996
memo written by Shabanji Opukah (1) of British-American
Tobacco(BAT)claiming that "one of the IMASCO Directors sits on the IDRC
Board!" In fact, Mr. Opukah erred in this statement. A thorough review of
the Annual Reports of both IMASCO and IDRC revealed that there were never
any cross-appointments between the Boards of Directors of IMASCO and
IDRC.(2)(3) British-American Tobacco did not succeed in getting one of
its own on the IDRC Board until 2007, when Barbara McDougall was appointed
to the IDRC Board of Directors. She was appointed Chair of the Board of
IDRC in December 2007 by the Canadian government, a position she still
holds. She had been on the Board of Directors of Imperial Tobacco(BAT's
Canadian subsidiary)since March 2004 and remained a Director of Imperial
Tobacco until her term ended at the end of March, 2010.
IDRC was a pioneer among government agencies in supporting tobacco
control in developing countries. Beginning in 1994, IDRC became a source
of great concern to BAT. IDRC's International Tobacco Initiative was
launched in 1994. Tobacco companies, particularly BAT, tracked closely
all the activities of IDRC and the people and agencies it funded in
Africa. It also did what it could to reduce the effectiveness of IDRC-
sponsored events. In a report of 1995 World No-Tobacco Day activities to
BAT Public Affairs Managers in Africa, the same Mr. Opukah reported, "The
emergence of several new Panos and IDRC related bodies poses serious
challenges. There is need to check on them and to keep the media and
Government abreast of our own good example stories." (4) In an internal
memorandum of 2 October 1996, Mr. Opukah gave high praise to IDRC-funded
tobacco control activities in Africa, describing them as "truly serious
threats to the long-term success of our business."(5)
Let us hope that IDRC soon undertakes meaningful action to restore
its credibility as a leader in fostering improved tobacco control in
developing countries and that IDRC returns quickly to the business at hand
- providing "truly serious threats to the long-term success" of the
tobacco industry in developing countries.
References
1. Opukah S. International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and
Tobacco Control. [Online]. 1996 [cited 2010 06 02. Available from:
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ozz44a99.
2. IMASCO Annnual Reports. 1991-1997.
3. International Development Research Centre Annual Reports. 1991-
1997.
4. Opukah S. World No Tobacco Day Analysis and Recommendations.
[Online]. 1995 [cited 2010 06 03. Available from:
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lvb14a99.
5. Opukah S. Tobacco Control Fellowships - Southern Africa. [Online].
1996 [cited 2010 06 03. Available from:
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xdj73a99.
I refer to the recently published paper-
'Scott L Tomar, Hillel R Alpert and Georgery N Connolly. Patterns of dual
use of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco among US males: findings from
national surveys. Tob Control 2010;19:104-109'.
The rising trend of smokeless tobacco (ST) use, among adolescent and
young adults is not only a problem in the USA, it is equally affecting the
same age group population in India and...
I refer to the recently published paper-
'Scott L Tomar, Hillel R Alpert and Georgery N Connolly. Patterns of dual
use of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco among US males: findings from
national surveys. Tob Control 2010;19:104-109'.
The rising trend of smokeless tobacco (ST) use, among adolescent and
young adults is not only a problem in the USA, it is equally affecting the
same age group population in India and SE Asian Countries. In India, this
age group (10-24 years old) has 315 million people (30% of total
population), since India is home to just over 1.18 billion, the second largest
population in the world (1). Although this cohort is healthier, and their
literacy rate is higher, unfortunately, this population group is at
the highest risk of chewing tobacco related fatal consequences and
developing nicotine addiction. Alarmingly, a significant proportion of
Indian youths is developing chewing tobacco related oral/dental diseases
of high morbidity rate, and of them, oral sub-mucosal fibrosis (OSMF/OSF), a
disabling oral health problem, manifested with the burning mouth
sensation, restricted mouth opening, dysarthria, dysphagia and sometimes
loss of hearing functions, especially in advanced cases. OSF has got high
malignant transforming potential (2-10%, thus risking of full blown
oral cancer (20~25% of all cancers in India, varies at locations and the
regional countries).
It is a serious public health concern in India. Now-days smoking
tobacco (Beedi-Indian version of smoking tobacco and conventional
cigarette) is gradually being replaced with smokeless tobacco (SL). The product
is marketed in various brands of chewing tobacco sachets; among them, Gutkha,
Kaini, Paan-parag are common (2). These products are extremely popular,
cheaper (compared with cigarettes), commonly available in every corner of the
countries, and use is unrestricted in public places,
unlike smoking. We studied 9,288 hospital attending cases, measuring their knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP
score). The study reveled that a significant proportion of this population is
unaware of the ill-effects of chewing tobacco, and a high proportion of the
population both chews and smokes tobacco (2). In India
SL is classified in five groups (3). Although none of the SL products in
India is exactly similar to Swedish wet Snus, or up-coming Japanese ST
'Zerostyle Mint' (4), but Khaini is one which is wet. Khaini is
commercially available and could be prepared at home or work-places, just
by buying a sachet of tobacco flecks and a mini-tube of calcium hydroxide
(slaked lime). This wet variety of SL, ie. Khaini is a very dangerous
product. A study revealed that Khaini causes
loss of hyterozygocity (LOH) of the chromosomes, and may delete and mutate
a number of tumor suppressor genes 'TSGs'(5). ST use is now a global
problem, not only confined within the SE Asian population (including SE
Asian migrants in USA and Europe), but also in China, Taiwan, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Sigapore, Phillipines, and Africa. In my opinion, the FCTC of WHO
should come forward with a special focus and strategic plan to prevent
and control ST and ST related health problems. A small interest /working
group is in progress to study ST related OSF in India and regional
countries. The group welcomes any advisory support and participation.
References.
(1). Ministry of Statistics & Programme implementation, East
Block 10, R K Puram, New Delhi-110066 http://mospi.nic.in/ (visited
20.05.2010).
(2). Chitta Ranjan Choudhury. Effects of KAP intervention on oral
mucosal lesions associated with personal habit(s). In. Publisher Nitte
University, India in association with Bournemouth University, UK ; pp.59-
63, 1st ed. February 2010. BDA (British Dental Association) Lib Cat. No.
Class No: D 781 CHO http://bdalib.answeb.co.uk/amlibweb/webquery.dll
(3). Chitta Ranjan Choudhury. Classification of marketed quid
sachets based on composition In. Handbook of Oral Cancer Screening &
Education. Publisher Nitte University, India in association with
Bournemouth University , UK ; pp.11,12 & 65-67. 1st ed. February
2010. BDA (British Dental Association) Lib Cat. No. Class No: D 781 CHO
http://bdalib.answeb.co.uk/amlibweb/webquery.dll
(4). Japan Tobacco Inc. (JT) (TSE: 2914). JT to Launch New Style of
Smokeless Tobacco Product 'Zerostyle Mint'.
http://www.jt.com/investors/media/press_releases/2010/0317_01/index.html
(Visited 21.05.2010)
(5). Nobuharu Y, Tsukasu K, Akia K, Takahiko S and Chitta Choudhury.
Loss of Heteozygosity (LOH) on Chromosomes 2q, 3p and 21q in Indian
squamous cell carcinoma. Bull Tokyo Dent Coll (2007) 48 (3): 109-117.
Authors
1. Chitta Ranjan Choudhury*
(Correspondence)
Professor & Director, International Centre for Tropical Oral
Health Poole Hospital NHS and Bournemouth University, England, UK.
And
Dept Oral Biology & Genomic Studies, ABSM Dental Sciences, Nitte
University, Mangalore, India.
Lead, OSF interventions: a multicentric study initiative.
We are grateful to learn of the deep concern in BAT about
unauthorised use of Web 2.0 social media platforms to promote BAT tobacco
products and its rules for its employees, agents and service providers
that no company or product promotions should appear on these [1]. We are
rather amused to learn though, that despite the vast resources of BAT, it
seeks understanding from critics that the task of locating such sites is...
We are grateful to learn of the deep concern in BAT about
unauthorised use of Web 2.0 social media platforms to promote BAT tobacco
products and its rules for its employees, agents and service providers
that no company or product promotions should appear on these [1]. We are
rather amused to learn though, that despite the vast resources of BAT, it
seeks understanding from critics that the task of locating such sites is
daunting.
We have had no difficulty in finding many instances of BAT tobacco
products being promoted on the web and find the call by Ms Murphy for
understanding of the difficulties involved in locating these somewhat
disingenuous. We would suggest she try a Google search
(www.google.com). Our Facebook project Monitoring Tobacco Advertising,
Promotion and Sponsorship currently has 745 members (see
www.facebook.com/MonitoringTobaccoAdvertising). We have put out a call to
these members to assist BAT in finding these rogue examples. Ms Murphy
might like to join our Facebook page to learn about these more swiftly
than her apparently stretched company resources currently permit.
Here is just one example of what we found in a nanosecond of
searching this morning. In June, 2009 BAT purchased an 85% stake in
Bentoel, the fourth largest kretek manufacturer in Indonesia [2] and
the remaining shares in August [3]. Bentoel brands include Bentoel, Star
Mild and X Mild and Country.
Star Mild has a Facebook page (www.facebook.com/pages/STAR-
MILD/30203449795), founded by PT Lestari Putra Wirasejati, a cigarette
manufacturing subsidiary of Bentoel. BAT has probably been very busy and
omitted to take down the site under its new commitment to forbidding such
sites.
YouTube is also awash with ads, some of obvious high resolution and
others copies, of Bentoel products (eg:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCTvhRlcKpc). YouTube management is highly
responsive to complaints about unauthorised use of material, so we can
assure Ms Murphy that her concern to see YouTube emptied of such examples
will soon be a reality after she begins to take action.
Simon Chapman
Becky Freeman
1. Murphy M. Rapid response to: British American Tobacco on Facebook:
undermining article 13 of the global World Health Organization Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control. Tobacco Control
tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/early/2010/04/14/tc.2009.032847.full/reply#tobaccocontrol_el_3404
2. www.tobaccoasia.com/previous-issues/industry-spotlight/53-industry-q3-
09/94-bat-buys-bentoel.html
3. www.alacrastore.com/company-snapshot/PT_Rajawali_Corporation-4371825
A very interesting paper confirming the exceptional value of NSD to
UK society. The obvious conclusion we should draw is that NSD is too
valuable to only happen once a year. In Somerset last year we started a
Somerset Stop Smoking Day on 1st October, aiming to encourage quit
attempts before the onset of winter with the slogan "Don't be left out in
the cold this winter", making a play on the smoking...
A very interesting paper confirming the exceptional value of NSD to
UK society. The obvious conclusion we should draw is that NSD is too
valuable to only happen once a year. In Somerset last year we started a
Somerset Stop Smoking Day on 1st October, aiming to encourage quit
attempts before the onset of winter with the slogan "Don't be left out in
the cold this winter", making a play on the smoking ban requirement to
smoke outside. I would suggest that a national stop smoking day in the
autumn could only be a good thing.
With respect to the recent article by Freeman et al. (Tobacco Control
doi:10.1136/tc.2009.032847), I would like to make clear it's absolutely
not our policy to use social networking sites such as Facebook to promote
our tobacco product brands. To do so could breach local advertising laws
and our own International Marketing Standards, which apply to our
companies everywhere.
With respect to the recent article by Freeman et al. (Tobacco Control
doi:10.1136/tc.2009.032847), I would like to make clear it's absolutely
not our policy to use social networking sites such as Facebook to promote
our tobacco product brands. To do so could breach local advertising laws
and our own International Marketing Standards, which apply to our
companies everywhere.
Social media and other types of user-generated
content sites are growing at a phenomenal
rate. Because of this, earlier this year we reminded our employees,
agencies and service providers of our long-standing rules, to ensure that
they were in no doubt about their existing obligations and
responsibilities as they apply to this relatively new and growing medium.
Our rules mean that employees, agents and service providers cannot
freely and on their own initiative post advertising material, in whole or
part, on social networking sites, blog sites, chat forums or other user-generated content sites such as You Tube, whatever the intention in posting the material may be.
The web is vast and constantly changing, and no company can continuously
police it. Things can happen there that we simply
don't know about. However, we can work hard to
ensure that our rules on internet use are understood and applied by our
own people and contractors, and we are doing so.
This report raises concerns that we share, and to that extent it
helps us. However its scope is very broad, and the report itself points
to the importance of distinguishing between personal and commercial
content on the web. Our people are, of course, free to use sites such as
Facebook in their private lives or to take part in business forums such as
career networking, provided this excludes anything that could be viewed as
tobacco product advertising.
Nonetheless, the report has drawn to our attention some specific
instances which "if they have involved any of
our employees or service providers" would
certainly be wrong and should not have happened. We are investigating
these and if we find that Group employees or service providers have posted
material that they shouldn't, perhaps out of naivety, we will be telling
them to remove it.
It is totally true that tobacco control is funded very little compared to the profits derived by the tobacco companies and the taxes collected by governments. At one point (in the 80s?), WHO had suggested that 1% of the tobacco taxes be allocated to fund tobacco control activities. Then this suggestion "disappeared": I wonder if you know why as it would be a simple request that remains valid.
It is also true tha...
In this paper, Mejia et al run a number of Monte Carlo simulations based on a set of totally unrealistic assumptions to reach the conclusion that promoting smokeless tobacco as a safer alternative to cigarettes is unlikely to result in substantial health benefits at a population level. In their analysis, Mejia et al do not consider the potential impact on the current adult smokers who will account for virtually all of the...
How might those estimates change if we all told smokers the truth?
What if the government changed the warning labels to read "THIS PRODUCT IS NOT A 100% SAFE ALTERNATIVE TO SMOKING"? See what a difference one tiny change can make? This would lead folks to ask, "Well if it's not 100% safe, how much safer is it?"
The way the message is worded now, 85% of the people who read it conclude it means that...
Glantz et al conclude that "Promoting smokeless tobacco as a safer alternative to cigarettes is unlikely to result in substantial health benefits at a population level."
Obviously Glantz is not up to speed on Sweden. It has the lowest incidence of lung cancer in the developed world because so many smokers have switched to snus.
"Results: There were 172,000 lung cancer deaths among men in the EU in 200...
I read with interest your article affirming public support in England for dedicated cigarette price increases and especially highlighting the finding that almost 50% of smokers supported the measure.
As proposed by the authors, the support for the price hike seems likely to be contingent on allocating funds to tobacco control activities (Surveys from United States, Australia, New Zealand and several European and...
Re: Africa/Canada: BAT Director on Aid Board Spurs Boycott Tobacco Control. June 2010, Vol 19, No 3, pp. 175-176
Reference is made in the above-noted article to a 15 October 1996 memo written by Shabanji Opukah (1) of British-American Tobacco(BAT)claiming that "one of the IMASCO Directors sits on the IDRC Board!" In fact, Mr. Opukah erred in this statement. A thorough review of the Annual Reports of both IMASCO...
I refer to the recently published paper- 'Scott L Tomar, Hillel R Alpert and Georgery N Connolly. Patterns of dual use of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco among US males: findings from national surveys. Tob Control 2010;19:104-109'.
The rising trend of smokeless tobacco (ST) use, among adolescent and young adults is not only a problem in the USA, it is equally affecting the same age group population in India and...
We are grateful to learn of the deep concern in BAT about unauthorised use of Web 2.0 social media platforms to promote BAT tobacco products and its rules for its employees, agents and service providers that no company or product promotions should appear on these [1]. We are rather amused to learn though, that despite the vast resources of BAT, it seeks understanding from critics that the task of locating such sites is...
Dear Daniel
A very interesting paper confirming the exceptional value of NSD to UK society. The obvious conclusion we should draw is that NSD is too valuable to only happen once a year. In Somerset last year we started a Somerset Stop Smoking Day on 1st October, aiming to encourage quit attempts before the onset of winter with the slogan "Don't be left out in the cold this winter", making a play on the smoking...
With respect to the recent article by Freeman et al. (Tobacco Control doi:10.1136/tc.2009.032847), I would like to make clear it's absolutely not our policy to use social networking sites such as Facebook to promote our tobacco product brands. To do so could breach local advertising laws and our own International Marketing Standards, which apply to our companies everywhere.
Social media and other types of user-...
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