TY - JOUR T1 - Why governments cannot afford Codentify to support their track and trace solutions JF - Tobacco Control JO - Tob Control SP - 706 LP - 708 DO - 10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2017-053970 VL - 27 IS - 6 AU - Hana Ross AU - Michael Eads AU - Michael Yates Y1 - 2018/11/01 UR - http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/27/6/706.abstract N2 - Background In anticipation of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (ITP) entering into force in 2018, there is a growing demand for information on track and trace (T&T) solutions for tobacco products. This article contrasts the efficacy of Codentify from the perspective of authentication with that of material-based multilayered security technologies.Method To calculate the probability of detecting one fraudulent pack under Codentify, we relied on a modified Bernoulli trial experiment with independent repeated sampling without replenishment. The probability is calculated using a multinomial distribution formula adjusted for the fact that both legitimate and non-legitimate packs may be sold in the market.Results In a relatively small market, a law enforcement authority would have to inspect over 27 000 (almost 31 000) packs per week to have a 90% (95%) certainty that it did not miss a fraudulent pack under the Codentify system. A material based T&T solution would require only 45 (59) pack inspections a week to have the same level of confidence.Conclusions This study demonstrates the inefficiency of Codentify compared to other solutions that incorporate material-based security features. Signatories to the ITP should reject Codentify due to both its low efficacy and its clear violation of the ITP’s requirement that T&T shall not be performed by or delegated to the tobacco industry or its front groups. ER -