Statement numbers, statements within clusters listed in descending order of average importance, and importance rating mean and standard deviation (SD)
| Number | Statement | Mean | SD |
|---|---|---|---|
| ASHRAE, American Society of Heating, Refridgerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers; FOIA, Freedom of Information Act; MSA, Master Settlement Agreement. | |||
| Lobbying and legislative strategy | 3.71 | 0.94 | |
| 85 | Writing and pushing pre-emptive legislation at state level | 4.67 | 0.58 |
| 8 | Creating loopholes in laws and agreements (e.g. the MSA) to allow business as usual | 4.57 | 0.68 |
| 26 | Contributing funds to political groups at federal, state and local level, to support industry goals | 4.43 | 0.98 |
| 53 | Using clout to influence introduction, advancement, modification, or suppression of bills in legislative bodies | 4.38 | 0.74 |
| 87 | Lobbying to assure that funds directed to tobacco control are diverted to non-tobacco control initiatives | 4.33 | 0.73 |
| 27 | Using clout to limit powers of regulatory agencies (jurisdiction, procedures, budgets) | 4.29 | 0.78 |
| 63 | Providing legislators with contributions, gifts, and other perks | 4.10 | 0.77 |
| 44 | Promoting partial or weak measures as an alternative to effective measures | 4.10 | 0.77 |
| 52 | Inserting limiting language in legislation, such as “knowingly” sell tobacco to minors | 4.05 | 0.74 |
| 13 | Writing weak tobacco control legislation then arguing that tobacco control measures are ineffective | 3.86 | 0.85 |
| 17 | Ghost writing non-tobacco bills (e.g. sewage) with clauses that if enacted, would bring pre-emption via the backdoor | 3.71 | 0.90 |
| 7 | Lobbying government officials to set unrealistic tobacco control goals to ensure programme failure | 3.67 | 1.20 |
| 61 | Using political and/or monetary clout to delay funding of tobacco control programmes | 3.67 | 1.06 |
| 36 | Lobby to assure that funds are diverted to ineffective tobacco control activities | 3.67 | 1.06 |
| 62 | Working against campaign finance reform to maintain influence | 3.62 | 1.12 |
| 21 | Working against strengthening campaign and lobbying disclosure laws | 3.57 | 1.08 |
| 19 | Promoting tort reform | 3.38 | 1.24 |
| 41 | Using clout to assign tobacco control programmes to hostile/apathetic agencies for implementation | 3.19 | 1.08 |
| 76 | Conducting “briefings” of members of Congress, allies, and consultants to sway opinion on an issue | 3.14 | 1.06 |
| 1 | Promoting smokers’ rights legislation | 3.05 | 1.02 |
| 29 | Use of tobacco companies subsidiaries (i.e. Miller and Kraft) in political opposition to tobacco control legislation | 3.05 | 1.12 |
| 10 | Ensuring supportive legislators will lob soft questions during testimony | 2.38 | 0.92 |
| 2 | Using tobacco employees to lobby against legislation with the excuse that it threatens their job security | 2.38 | 1.16 |
| Legal and economic intimidation | 3.46 | 1.04 | |
| 16 | Devoting considerable resources to legal fights | 4.76 | 0.44 |
| 65 | Create and fund front groups | 3.81 | 1.12 |
| 46 | Assuring that court battles are fought in favourable jurisdictions | 3.76 | 0.83 |
| 64 | Infiltrating official and de facto regulatory organisations (like ASHRAE) | 3.43 | 1.16 |
| 58 | Filtering documentation through their attorneys in order to hide behind attorney work product | 3.29 | 1.35 |
| 9 | Encourage (or fail to discourage) smuggling as a way to counter tax hikes. | 3.10 | 1.26 |
| 4 | Counter tax increases with promotions and cents off | 3.05 | 1.20 |
| 48 | Threatening to withdraw support from credible groups to control | 2.48 | 0.98 |
| Usurping the agenda | 3.39 | 1.12 | |
| 42 | Developing alliances with retailers, vendors, and the hospitality industry in opposition to public health policies | 3.90 | 0.89 |
| 40 | Usurping the public health process, such as creating their own youth tobacco prevention programmes | 3.33 | 1.20 |
| 22 | Avoiding regulatory and legislative interventions by establishing their own programmes such, as “We Card” | 3.24 | 1.04 |
| 66 | Promoting a tobacco control focus that is limited to youth issues | 3.24 | 1.26 |
| 35 | Shifting blame to the victims (e.g. passing youth possession laws to punish youths) | 3.24 | 1.22 |
| Creating illusion of support | 3.27 | 1.09 | |
| 54 | Using legal and constitutional challenges to undermine federal, state, and local legislative and regulatory initiatives | 4.52 | 0.75 |
| 81 | Using anti-lobbying legislation to suppress tobacco control advocacy | 3.57 | 1.16 |
| 68 | Flying in cadre of “experts” to fight local/state legislation | 3.43 | 0.98 |
| 39 | Creating the illusion of a pro-tobacco grassroots movement through direct mail database and paid-for petition names | 3.19 | 1.21 |
| 60 | Using international activities to avoid domestic rules on ads, taxation, etc | 3.05 | 1.02 |
| 33 | Entering false testimony and false data into the public record | 2.95 | 1.20 |
| 75 | Tying states’ MSA money to increases/decreases of smoking prevalence | 2.95 | 1.32 |
| 59 | Using employees and their families to make campaign contributions that are difficult to track | 2.52 | 1.08 |
| Harassment | 3.26 | 1.19 | |
| 43 | Intimidating opponents with overwhelming resources | 4.38 | 0.74 |
| 32 | Using the courts, and threats of legal action to silence opponents | 4.19 | 0.93 |
| 37 | Harassing tobacco control workers via letters, FOIAs, and legal action. | 3.43 | 1.43 |
| 56 | Silencing industry insiders | 3.19 | 1.36 |
| 23 | Hassling prominent tobacco control scientists for their advocacy work | 3.00 | 1.45 |
| 3 | Infiltrating tobacco prevention and control groups | 2.81 | 1.17 |
| 25 | Trying to undermine those selling effective cessation products | 1.81 | 1.25 |
| Undermining science | 3.26 | 1.09 | |
| 11 | Creating doubt about the credibility of science by paying scientists to disseminate pro-tobacco information | 3.76 | 0.77 |
| 18 | Sowing confusion about the meaning of statistical significance and research methods | 3.57 | 1.12 |
| 38 | Creating scientific forums to get pro-tobacco information into the scientific literature | 3.33 | 1.24 |
| 5 | Influencing scientific publication by paying journal editors to write editorials opposing tobacco restrictions | 3.10 | 1.09 |
| 71 | Creating doubt about the credibility of science by paying scientists to provide expert testimony | 3.10 | 1.22 |
| 80 | Creating doubt about the credibility of legitimate science by paying scientists to conduct research | 3.05 | 1.16 |
| 86 | Conducting studies that, by design, cannot achieve a significant result | 2.90 | 1.04 |
| Media manipulation | 2.91 | 1.13 | |
| 77 | Using advertising dollars to control content of media | 3.71 | 0.96 |
| 34 | Putting own “spin” on the issues by manufacturing information sources | 3.43 | 1.12 |
| 67 | Taking advantage of the “balanced reporting” concept to get equal time for junk science | 2.86 | 1.20 |
| 69 | Ghost writing pro-tobacco articles | 2.76 | 1.22 |
| 6 | Avoiding the key health questions by saying they are not experts and then not agreeing with the experts | 2.71 | 1.27 |
| 84 | Misrepresenting facts in situations where there is no time to verify | 2.67 | 0.97 |
| 74 | Publicly acknowledging the risk of tobacco use, but minimising the magnitude | 2.67 | 1.20 |
| 30 | Publicising research into “safe cigarettes” | 2.48 | 1.12 |
| Public relations | 2.85 | 1.10 | |
| 12 | Using philanthropy to link their public image with positive causes | 4.00 | 0.89 |
| 28 | Using philanthropy to build a constituency of support among credible groups | 3.62 | 0.80 |
| 73 | Diverting attention from the health issues by focusing attention on the economic issues | 3.48 | 0.98 |
| 51 | Distracting attention from the real issues with alternative stances such as accommodation and ventilation | 3.38 | 1.40 |
| 88 | Asserting that restrictions on tobacco could lead to restrictions on other industries and products | 3.38 | 0.92 |
| 14 | Minimising importance of misdeeds in the past by claiming they have changed | 3.24 | 1.41 |
| 20 | Argue that tobacco control policies are anti-business | 3.19 | 1.03 |
| 72 | Maintaining that the tobacco industry is of critical importance to the economy | 3.19 | 1.08 |
| 45 | Portraying themselves “responsible”, “reasonable” and willing to engage in a “dialogue” | 2.90 | 1.34 |
| 78 | Misrepresenting legal issues to naive reporters and stock analysts | 2.86 | 1.20 |
| 79 | Feeding pro-tobacco information to market analysts who are predisposed to accepting and transmitting it | 2.86 | 1.20 |
| 15 | Representing people as “anti-smoker” instead of anti-smoking | 2.81 | 1.03 |
| 82 | Developing pro-tobacco media content, such as videos and press releases | 2.67 | 0.97 |
| 83 | Painting tobacco control activists as extremists | 2.67 | 1.15 |
| 55 | Pretending that the “real” tobacco control agenda is prohibition | 2.57 | 1.08 |
| 57 | Casting tobacco control as a civil rights threat | 2.52 | 1.25 |
| 49 | Portraying tobacco control as a class struggle against poor and minority groups | 2.48 | 0.98 |
| 24 | Extensive media training for executives who will be in the public eye | 2.43 | 1.12 |
| 70 | Shifting attention toward lawyers’ monetary gains and away from tobacco litigation | 2.38 | 1.20 |
| 47 | Avoiding losing public debates by overcomplicating simple issues | 2.29 | 1.15 |
| 31 | Blaming it on “fall-guys” (past or rogue employees) when the industry is caught misbehaving | 2.00 | 1.22 |
| 50 | Refusing or avoiding media debates where they think they will do poorly | 1.71 | 0.72 |