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Smoking Restrictions as a Self-Control Mechanism

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Abstract

Using data from Current Population Survey Tobacco Use Supplements spanning 1992–2002, this study shows that smokers who plan to quit smoking are more supportive of regulations than are other smokers. Failed quitters who plan to try again are more supportive of restrictions than are smokers planning to quit for the first time. These findings indicate that many smokers support regulatory restrictions to reduce their costs of quitting by exploiting the discipline offered by regulatory control. From 1992 to 2002, support for smoking restrictions in public areas rose dramatically among both nonsmokers and smokers.

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Correspondence to Joni Hersch.

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JEL Classification: I180, I120, H000

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Hersch, J. Smoking Restrictions as a Self-Control Mechanism. J Risk Uncertainty 31, 5–21 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-005-2927-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-005-2927-2

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